SPAIN -- by Peirce F. Lewis with a few modifications. Included because of its significance in understanding our neighbors to the south.

Theme:

A country whose situation lay in the path of great world events, so that the Spanish (sometimes willingly, sometimes unwillingly) repeatedly played a central role in changing the course of world history. And whose site in pre-industrial times served as an admirable cradle for some of the world's most successful political organizations. But, whose site was ultimately proved to be inadequate to support her political ambitions during Europe's ascent to industrial power and world domination--so that the 20th Century found Spain not master of half the world, but a pitiable ruin--living on memories of past glories.

Sub-theme:

That despite Spain's lamentable condition in recent times, her political behavior on earlier, more successful times helps explain the condition of the areas she conquered and dominated--Hispanic America in particular.

Corollary and persisting argument: That the present cannot easily be understood without understanding the past: in short, the present is incomprehensible outside an historic context. BUT, that history makes little sense unless it is studied in its geographic context. In sum, we cannot expect to understand the past unless we understand the geography of the past--a geography which was perceived and manipulated by people very different than ourselves--whose logic often seems perverse or ridiculous in contemporary terms, but seemed quite sensible at the time.

Spain's central role in Europe's main periods of ascendancy: Roman, Renaissance, and modern.

Spain's ambivalent role in Europe. Access to both Mediterranean and Atlantic, Africa and Europe, yet central to none. The idea of Spain as off-sides, and the consequences of that idea.

Spain's ambivalent history: disaster and glory. A quick account.

Recent disasters: Napoleonic hopes and Bourbon repression. Repression of republican hopes in the 19th Century. The loss of empire, 1810-1989. Political polarization and terrorism. Spain's failure to modernize. The Civil War (1936-1939) and its attendant horrors. The Franco regime as final vestige of western European fascism. Juan Carlos, and what he is up against. What 1992 means to Spain.

The contrast with earlier glories: Spain's participation in "world" affairs during Phoenician, Greek, Carthaginian times. Iberia as major Roman colony. What the Romans did. The Moorish invasion: the Guadalquivir Valley as perhaps the most civilized part of Europe. The Reconquista, and the Siglo de Oro. Creation of American empire, and Spanish domination of Europe. The decline.

The Geographic underpinnings of Spain's rise and decline.

Site:

A microcosm of Europe, and the deficiencies of Spanish site as a seat of major political power.

Landforms and rivers: the Meseta. Absence of a "natural" center. Toledo and Madrid as garrison towns. Economic activity along the fringes. The beginnings of fragmentation. Lusitania, Catalonia, Asturias, Galicia, Vascongadas (the Basque Country). Barcelona and Santander as major industrial centers.

Climate:

Spain as boundary between desert and forest. Northern vs. Southern Spain. Temperatures and olive trees. Aridity in the Meseta. Reinforcement of a hollow center. Importance of rivers for irrigation, especially in the south. Guadalquivir again. Arabic perceptions.

Situation:

Why Spain was hard to overlook, but still lay off-sides.

Spain's two-sea frontage. Comparisons with France.

Spain as Afro-European bridge.

Spain's off-center location, which enabled Spain to miss some of Europe's main events, especially in recent times: Protestantism, the commercial and industrial revolution.

The heavy hand of history on contemporary Spanish politics: analogues with South Africa. A brief chronicle to make the point.

-- Spain at the end of Roman times.

-- The Moorish invasion, and why it occurred. Where the Moors turned back, and why. The Guadalquivir as center of Moorish power. Granada, Cordova, Sevilla. Importance of irrigation to Moorish power.

-- Christian reactions. The Reconquista. The character of Spanish Christianity during the Reconquista, and why it made a difference in later time.

-- 1492 as watershed.

(1) The fall of Granada and what happened as a result, especially to Moors and Jews, but also to the mentality of Spanish Christians

(2) The Discoveries, and what the Spanish exported to the New World in the way of ideas. The horrendous impact of Spanish rule on Hispano-American governmental organization, land tenure, and political institutions.

-- The gradual decline of Spanish power, and the rise of regional factionalism. The road to Civil War. Reintegration with Europe and its effects.

Basically unmodified from Dr. Peirce Lewis's fine original.

GERMANY

"German male drivers are the most aggressive in Europe, and this feeling of power behind a wheel, this desire to dominate in a fast car, is stronger than else where. It's not new. It goes far back into history and has been developed over many generations, this inherited internalized frustration of the German. Jung would have called it a based nation characteristic." Carmen Lakashus, Psychologist.

"The Germans make everything difficult, both for themselves and for everyone else." Goethe.

"The German soul has corridors and interconnecting corridors in it, there are caves, hiding-places, dungeons in it; its disorder possesses much of the fascinating and mysterious. The German is acquainted with the hidden paths to chaos." Nietzche.

"A bundle of strong and troubled instincts, born artists without taste, technicians who are still feudal, fathers of families who are warriors, oppressors who want to be loved, separatists who are strictly obedient, knights bearing garlands who vomit beer . . . a sublime green ocean where the net hosts a tangle of monsters and treasures." DeGaulle.

To the Social Democratic party congress after he fell from power: "The dry land belongs to the French and Russians, the sea to the British--but we are undisputed rulers in the empire of dreams." Helmut Schmidt quoting Heine.

The international marketing director for Deutsche Aerospace, subsidiary of Daimler-Benz, resigned following disclosure he flew the old German imperial war flag in his front yard. Neo-Nazis regularly brandish the First World War flag, with an iron cross and eagles at rallies where they chant "Foreigners Out." NYT 3De92, p.A12

Themes:

legacy of Nazism and wartime defeat

two Germanies and their coexistence; problems of merging societies and economies

wary search for a new national identity where nationalism has been catastrophic

federal structure and lack of "proper" capital

waning of authoritarianism

forging of genuine democracy

clash of generations

thoroughness and perfectionism---plusses and minuses

streak of insecurity

Adenauer Erhardt Kiesinger Brandt Schmidt Kohl

Themes:

1. Situation can have a striking effect on a nation's fortunes. Germany with more neighbors than any other country in Europe and with a history of being pressed by strong ones is a classic case of situation affecting a nation's history.

2. Site characteristics are also important. In Germany's case they have influenced the political geography--the old feudal states and the current Lander, wars with neighbors--and its economic development. Actual and perceived resource problems have served as convenient reasons for pushing Germany into wars as in the conflicts with France over Alsace and Lorraine.

3. Does a nation always have to have a single government and a contiguous defined and recognized territory? The idea of a German nation existed for centuries without either. Present day analogs?--Kurds, Armenians, Palestinians . . .

4. One individual can influence a nation and the world. Examples from German history include Martin Luther, Karl Marx, Otto von Bismarck, as well as Hitler.

5. Sometimes, defeat of the most crushing nature can lead to renewal and the overturn of former shibboleths. Both Germany and Japan are classic examples.

Germany is important historically, especially for its role in changing the world over the last century. But its current importance stems from its role as the world's third largest economy (with only 62 million people + East Germany as the world's supposed former tenth economy with only 17 million) and the critical role of both Germanies in their respective economic and political alliances (EEC and COMECON, NATO and Warsaw Pact). Germany's present attempts to avoid inflation by raising its interest rates at the same time as it is running a large budget deficit are reminiscent of US experience in the early 1980s and are on the verge of destabilizing other European economies while also strongly affecting the rest of the world.

Today, the Federal Republic is, especially for Europe, a strikingly decentralized state. Its 11 Lander have important powers and were jealously independent of Bonn. It will be interesting to see what happens as the federal government functions are moved to Berlin. It is unusual also in that there is no really dominant city. Berlin (1.9 million) Hamburg (1.6 million) and Munich (1.4 million are the leaders but there are many cities in the half million range and 68 with over 100,000 people. This urban structure descends from Germany's history as a collection of independent states until the late 19th century, its diversity of landscapes and its physiography.

Germany became a nation late (1871) because of history and its geographic situation and site characteristics. While the people have been recognized as a culture group since before the Christian era, it was only pulled together by Charlemagne. After him, the rulers of individual territories jealously resisted actual central authority. Martin Luther and his "theses" split Germany into protestant and catholic territories and the 30 years war (ended in 1648) solidified the fragmentation until the Prussians succeeded in forming a nation in 1871. Its neighbors had long feared the potential power of a united German people and succeeding events seemed to justify those fears. Hitler's attempt to create a Third Reich was only the most spectacular example of a "hunger" for a greater Germany incorporating all Germanic peoples. In the postwar era, the W. German desire for unity (symbolized in the Basic Law of 1949 and provisions for assisted entry of "ethnic" Germans from Eastern Europe) via reunification with E. and W. Germany was a major cause of strain in Europe. Its recent economic moves and assertiveness vis-a-vis Eastern Europe, especially Yugoslavia are arousing strong (although official comment is muted) concern and fear among its Western European partners.

Important Dates

800-843 Karle der Grosse (Charlemagne) last leader of "united" Europe.

1241 Hanseatic League established. A chance to pull Germany into a nation but path disrupted by feuding nobles.

1440 Gutenberg.

1517 Martin Luther

1555 Peace of Augsburg--Protestant and Catholic states accepted.

1648 End of 30 years war.

1756 End of 7 years war establishes Prussia as great power.

1830-1840 Beginning of industrialization and founding of German Customs Union.

1867 Prussians beat Austria in seven weeks war. Austria out of German Confederation.

1870 Franco-Prussian War. Prussia gets Alsace and part of Lorrain (coal and iron ore); French-German dislike intensifies.

1871 Unification under Prussian leadership

1914 Germany along with Austria enter WWI with high hopes

1918 Even after beating Russia, Germany accepts armistice (allies make mistake in not emphasizing German military defeat--leads to idea, exploited by Hitler, of a Germany betrayed by politicians.

1919 Treaty of Versailles exacts huge reparations and reduces German territory by 13.5 percent. Seeds of WWII.

1928-1933 Start of economic recovery after horrendous inflation sabotaged by great depression. Millions out of work. Sets scene for Hitler's accession.

1938 Anschluss (reunion) with Austria, accession of Sudetenland at Munich.

1939 Rest of Czechoslovakia acquired. Hitler-Stalin pact. Poland and WWII.

1945 Defeat--emphatic this time. Total and unconditional surrender.

1949 Federal Republic and German Democratic Republic created

1955 Federal Republic to NATO, GDR to Warsaw Pact.

1957 Federal Republic becomes founding member of EEC. Rapprochement with France begins (especially with Adenauer and deGaulle)

1970 Ostpolitik by Willy Brandt. Oder-Neisse border accepted

1975 Helsinki Accord "settles" European boundaries

1976 Mogadishu (Somalia) airplane hijacking ended. German military still good.

1989 Eastern European satellites collapse. Unification, new influence.

1990 Reunification. New drang nach osten? Or the EC foremost?

1996 Germany newly assertive in politics as well as economics.

Some Current Problems

1. What role is Germany to play in the world? Integrated part of a unified Western Europe? Linchpin of NATO and/or the European Community? European superstate? Dominator of Eastern Europe? A possible deal with Ukraine or Russia. And how likely now are the neutrality and demilitarization that were so worrisome to its NATO allies just yesterday?

2. Energy, industry, and ecology. Nukes and Acid Rain.

3. Low birth rate among Germans--6 born, 7 die. Existence of over 4.5 million emigrants from southern Europe and Turkey with high birth rates causing resentment and paranoia. Worse problems with refugees since 1990.

4. Youth--high unemployment, alienation. Sclerotic labor market.

5. Competition for markets with Japan, U.S. and newly industrializing countries. Can "Mercedes" reputation carry the day? A traditional pattern in continental Europe towards cartelization and managed "social market" economies may carry the day.

News items and miscellanea:

"Everyone a German," NYT 30No92, p.a15. Talks about an immigration policy as a necessity for Germany. Christopher Bertram, diplomatic correspondent for Die Zeit, notes it is very difficult for folk of non-German descent to get citizenship regardless of how long they've lived in the country. In 1990 only 20,000 of eight million foreigners in the country were granted citizenship. The problem is a result of an ancient law reflecting the old homogeneous German society.

"European treaty gets approval in Germany," AP 3De92. Overwhelming approval in the lower house of parliament for the Maastricht treaty on European unity.

"Offensive against neo-Nazis urged by German chancellor aid," AP 3DE92. This wire item story also reported that German soldiers beat up the owner and employees of a Yugoslav restaurant in a north German city. The seven soldiers who were drunk cursed the foreigners and shouted "Germany for he Germans!" and "foreigners go home."

"Germany bans a Neo-Nazi group in reaction to outcry on violence," NYT 28No92, pp 1 and 9. In addition to current bannings, at least seven far right groups were banned in the 1980s. This apparent violation of rights of free speech from an American perspective is due to German history, particularly the destabilization of the democratic Weimar republic by armed street gangs.

"Leather pants, golden beer (and bitter farmers)," NYT 17Oc92, p.2 talks about Bavarians, a proud tribe as the article puts it. "I have traveled everywhere...There is nowhere I haven't been. And I can tell you without any doubt, there is no place better or more beautiful than right here...can't shake a heritage that is this strong. ... They took away our Royal Bavarian Post and our Royal Bavarian Police and we survived that. We'll survive being governed by the Prussians, even though naturally I'd prefer it if we were still on our own."

"Voices of Europe: need for Germany far outweighs any fears," NYT 29Se92, p.a10. This is something you should read. A selection of European statesmen, artists, industrialists, politicians talk about Germany's role in Europe: "...they seemed to share a concensus that however great German economic power had become it was not to be wished away; indeed some thought it welcome. Neither was it free of potential peril. ...belief that an isolated Germany would represent far more of a threat than a Germany locked into European institutions, and that Germany's economic dominance was far less menacing than its military power had ever been."

"Medical care in Germany: With choices, and for all," NYT 23Ja93, pp. 1 and 4 discusses the social medicine system -- which dates back to Bismarck's policies of the 19th century. It is provided by nonprofit, private "sickness funds" legally mandatory for about 90 percent (all except the well off). Spending is about 8 percent of GNP compared to 14 in the United States. The money is paid by the government for poor people or the unemployed and by a levy on wages ranging from 9 to 18 percent; the average levy is 13.9 percent half paid by employee, half by employer like our social security system. Germans are concerned about rapid recent growth in outgoes just as we are in the United States.

Preliminary remarks

Theme:

The enormous differences between Hispanic America and Anglo-America, seen as a function of initial European settlement--and the time of that settlement. In Latin America, the overwhelming burden of Hispanic institutions in a region which has been independent of direct Spanish rule for nearly two centuries.

Sub-Theme:

Latin America, for all its variety, as a showcase for all the problems of the "underdeveloped" world, despite the fact that it has been theoretically independent for a long time, and theoretically democratic for a long time.

Contrasts between Anglo-America and Hispanic America: a laundry-list of reasons why it made a difference whether England or Spain originally settled a particular area.

(1) Place in the world: Latin America suffers from its association with Spain, an arrogant but fading star on the international scene from late 17th century. The U.S. gains from association with Britain during its early dynamic phase; Canada got the status quo types as its heritage from the revolutionary war. Both North American countries benefitted from their use of English.

In this century, especially since the end of the second world war, the U.S. of course has been the main reason for the supremacy of English as a world language.

(2) Political differences: the basic role of government.

-- Attitudes toward authoritarianism: church, army, and government

-- Attitudes toward centralization and federalism

-- Approaches to solving political differences: attitudes toward compromise. Conciliation vs. honor as civic virtues.

(3) Economic differences: attitudes toward money, work, land, and leisure

-- Availability of risk capital. What happens when land is capital.

-- Reliance on agriculture and mining as sources of basic income, and the effect of violent fluctuations in world prices. Copper, coffee, and "banana republics."

-- Condition of the economic infrastructure, especially transport systems; "colonial" patterns of roads and railroads.

-- Disparities in income between segments of the population: rich, poor, and middle-class.

(4) Demographic differences

-- Race, and attitudes toward race

-- Degree and rate of urbanization; primacy of cities

-- Birth rates, death rates, and rates of natural increase

(5) Great problems of the future: eating vs. ecology.

Differences within Latin America: Augelli's idea of "Mainland" vs. "Rimland"

-- "Mainland," and what it means in a Latin American context. Why Mexico is a prime example (see list below)

-- "Rimland," why the West Indies and Caribbean fringe (and perhaps the southern fringe of the U.S.) differ from the Mainland.

Differences in: Climate, crops, and colonial history, economic diversity, and linkages with Europe. Present demographic differences: race and population densities.

News items and miscellanea:

"Bolivians in fear as Maoist rebels slip in from Peru," NYT 5Se92 pp. 1 and 4. "Porous border and ill-equipped troops offer Shining Path a new base for violence."

"4 Caribbean islands quicken pace toward union," NYT 17Mr91, p.7. Four islands of the windward chain, Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Dominica began a series of talks hoping to get the creation of a single state of about 500,000 by as early as 1992. Discusses reasons for unification as well as barriers -- the ideas can be generalized to other small states.

"Response to Chile human rights report is violent," NYT 24Mr91, p.10 describes "terrorist" attacks after reports on human rights abuses of the previous military government. Just because S. American countries currently have elected governments doesn't mean that all is calm and rosy.

"Westminsters-in-the-sun," The Economist 9Ja88, p.36 talks of the former British territories that show democratic forms are not totally alien to the Caribbean.

"Refugees: Mexico. The new Mayans," The Economist, 9Ja88, p.40 discusses refugees from government sponsored violence in Guatemala who are settling in UN camps in southern Mexico.

"Roots of inequality," NYT 26Mr89, p. 4:1 lays out land ownership problems in some Latin American countries based on Worldwatch report. Examples: In Brazil the top 2% of landowners control 60% of arable land and 70% of rural households are landless or nearly so; in Colombia the top 4% of landowners control 68% of arable land and 66% of rural households are landless or nearly so, and in Guatemala the top 1% of landlords control 41% of arable land and 60% of rural households are totally or nearly landless.

"Middle-class protests cast cloud over Venezuelan democracy," NYT 6Ap92, p.14 discusses widespread disgust with the corrupt political system in Venezuela. Anyone reading this would not have been surprised by the attempted coup late in 1992.

"Brazil welcomes drop in population growth," NYT 8Mr92, p.18 says the growth rate has dropped below 2%. This is welcomed in a country that until recently had a policy that the more the better because of the limitless land available in the Amazon.

"Latin America cheers up," The Economist 18AP92, pp 11-12 talks about the prospective boom to our south and whether it is only another blip in a long up and down cycle ... as the article says, democracy is delicate.

"Brazil abortions: illegal in name only," NYT 21Jl91, p.12 talks about the underground abortion system in this nominally Catholic country. For instance it discusses one 46 year old woman with three children and 13 abortions.

"Venezuela's policy for Brazil's gold miners: bullets," NYT 16Fe92, p.20 discusses one of the border conflicts in South America; this one is due to gold miners crossing into Yanomani Indian pre serves in Venezuela in search of gold.

MEXICO: The prototype of Spain's legacy on the American "Mainland"

Theme:

A country which had the bad luck of becoming Europe's first overseas colony to produce enormous income for its owners--where the colonists maintained the longest and most stubborn control--and which (because it was seen to be "successful" from the beginning) had its political and economic institutions frozen in a nearly medieval mold for almost four centuries. And where, after the colonists were ejected with great violence, the country was left with neither the experience nor the institutions to govern itself, nor the machinery to develop or distribute its enormous riches. Where its northern neighbor repeatedly intervened from its first decades of independence, tearing away territory, invading at will, deepening both insecurities and resentments. And where, as a result, a good share of the country's modern energies have been wasted in murderous civil wars, and in searching for ways to exploit the country's great natural wealth. And where--just as the country began to show signs of economic and political strength--it found itself in a deadly race to keep up with exploding population and environmental degradation. Meanwhile, the country has served as a metaphor for Latin America's hopes and greatest fears. Current discussions with the United States and Canada over forming a North American Free Trade Area are a case in point.

A catalogue of troubles: a quick survey of some bad things that have happened to Mexico--and left permanent political and geographic scars

-- The Spanish Conquest (1519-21) as a murderous precedent

-- The fate of Mexican Indians: haciendas and mines as instruments of slavery

-- Peninsulares and criollos

-- The War of Independence (1810-21) and why it was worse than many similar wars in Latin America

-- The failure of "native" government: Santa Anna

-- Napoleon III, Maximilian, and the abortive French empire

-- The long dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz; the role of the United States

-- The Revolution (1910-1917) (etc.) and what it means; more American intervention

-- The PRI and Cardenas' following of Rooseveltian policies; nationalization of the country's patrimony -- oil and land.

-- Rise of the "new Mexico." The ultimate question: will population growth ruin Mexico's hopes of social and economic success in the 3rd world? Or will free trade with US and Canada rescue it?

The Spanish heritage: backdrop for tragedy.

-- How it all began: Cortes, and why it mattered that it was a Spaniard, and why it particularly mattered that he was a 16th Century Spaniard. The Conquistadors and where they came from. -- The Aztecs: The enormous importance of Aztec forms of government. How the Spanish moved in.

-- What the Spaniards found: a quick look at the physical site of Mexico

-- Climate. A review of analogues. The Mexican Plateau as essential highland tropics. Why the Spaniards found the Plateau attractive, and why they found both northern and southern Mexico hard to handle. -- Landforms and geology, and why they mattered (and still matter): the extraordinary difficulty in climbing the Sierra Madre Oriental or the Sierra Madre Occidental. The near absence of coastal plain. Volcanoes and volcanic soils. Gold, silver, and where they were found. The off-center location of oil.

-- The combined result. The Mexican Plateau as oasis. Mexico City as "primate city." The resemblance between Mexico and other Latin American republics, in patterns of population and transportation.

Spain's political and economic ambitions, and how she manipulated the geography of Mexico to meet those ambitions--so that even today, modern Mexicans are compelled to cope with Spanish institutions, some of which were invented 400 years ago.

Extractive economy, absentee owners, lack of concern for the poor by the rich.

Transportation, and why it was so overwhelmingly important to Spanish ambitions and the long-term destiny of Mexico

(1) Overseas transportation. How and why Spain arranged to control overseas shipping lanes. Strategic bases in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico. Havana, and the role of Florida. Spain's obsession with concentrated transport. The annual convoys. The special importance of certain ports: Vera Cruz and Acapulco as examples. Deliberate suppression of development in unapproved places.

(2) Internal road systems and what they were supposed to do. The overland silver convoys. Relationship between centralized transportation and centralized government. The gulf between city and country.

Mining and what it did.

Gold, silver, and the government. The royal fifth. Effect on economic development of Spain's preoccupation with Mexican silver. Labor demands and Indian exploitation. The overwhelming importance of a very few places. Neglect of other places.

Agriculture's role in Spanish administration

Spanish attitudes toward land-owning and manual labor. (Cf. discussion of the Reconquista). Haciendas: who owned them, and how they were run. The gulf between owner and worker. Corn, and the ruination of soil. The vicious circle of poverty, ignorance, and isolation. The extraordinary role of land-ownership in Mexican politics, and especially revolutionary politics.

Wars, Revolutions and their geographic effects: some invidious comparisons between Mexico and the United States.

(1) The War of Independence (1810-1821). Why the Mexican war of independence differed so profoundly from that of the U.S.--in motivation, in the way it was fought, and in its ultimate results. Why the revolution failed to trigger long-run social change.

(2) The U.S.-Mexican War (1848). What Mexico lost, and why (for a long time) the losses made so little difference.

(3) Juarez (1859-1872) and the French intervention (1861-1867). What Juarez tried to do, and why he failed.

(4) Porfirio Diaz and the American connection (1876-1910). The Porfirian peace, and foreign investments. How economic conservatives paradoxically laid the foundation for Mexico's most violent social and political revolution. Railroads, oil, etc.

(5) The Mexican Revolution (1910-1917 [?]), watershed in Mexican history. Memories of violence, and counter-revolutionary Americans. The Constitution of 1917 and how it is designed to change Mexican geography. New law for land and natural resources.

(6) The continuing revolution. The critical role of Cardenas (1934-40). Expropriation of oil fields in 1938, and the amazing American reaction, courtesy of FDRs presence in the White House.

The new Mexico and its new geography: why Mexico is often perceived as a leader of Third World nations (especially in Latin America), but why her successes exhibit signs of danger.

-- The new infrastructure: basis for optimism: roads, cities, industry. The shift to the North. Booms in desert agriculture. The huge new border cities: Tijuana, Mexicali, Ciudad Juarez, et. The Maquiladora economy. The free trade area with US and Canada (NAFTA).

-- The ominous signs: five examples

(1) Mexico's new industry, and its subsidiary function in American economics. Assembly plants of the Rio Grande valley as examples.

(2) Reliance on tourism for foreign exchange. Why tourism is an uncertain business and geographically inequitable. Acapulco vs. the rest of the state of Guerrero as examples.

(3) The growth of population and what it portends. The 125th million Mexican? Problems of underemployment and rising expectations, especially with urbanization. Emigration to the United States as an uneasy answer.

(4) Neighbors: closure against Mexicans to the North, by Mexicans to the South.

(5) Old Patterns of Patronage, Politics, and Corruption -- 1994 assassinations and the linkages to the PRI structure and the governing elite, drug politics, and the 1994-95 "currency crisis" as a replay.

-- Oil, and its possible effects on Mexican well-being; the lesson of Venezuela? or of Iran? Oil and debt.

Summary: why Mexico is worth watching. Mexico as bellwether.

News items and miscellanea

"Down Mexico way," The Economist 18Ap92 talks of problems of environmental degradation in the fast growing industrial maquiladora belt on the US border. This is about Mexico but the problems are near universal to our south.

"Global change and Mexico," Earth and Mineral Sciences, Vol 60. This report by Dr. Diana Liverman of Penn State's geography department talks about the impacts of the natural environment on Mexican agriculture and economy and prospective impacts of such changes as global warming.

"Voting plummets in Mexico: a gesture of no-confidence," NYT 4Ap91, p.8 could have been printed in 1992 also. While nominally democratic and with regular elections for over 60 years, Mexico, like many of its counterparts to the south has a somewhat different form of democracy than we are used to.

"Guatemalan refugees' homeward trek is delayed," NYT 15Ja93, p.a3. Refugees who have been in southern Mexico for 10 years have begun returning to Guatemala as part of negotiations aimed at ending an insurgency/guerrilla war. About 40,000, almost all Indians, were supposed to have left the country.

Theme:

A country whose tranquil history and familiar geography have led many Americans (and Canadians too) to take the nation for granted, and thus to ignore it. But where recent events raise serious questions of national identity--and even questions as to whether Canada can continue to survive.

Sub-Theme:

As we have seen in many parts of the earth, serious political trouble nearly always has a basic geographic dimension--and Canada is no exception. But Canada illustrates some of the important ways that geography can form a backdrop for political tranquility.

Canada and the United States: some elementary remarks made necessary by Americans' monumental ignorance of Canadian affairs.

(1) The obvious reasons that Canada is important to the U.S.:

-- Simple proximity; the "miracle" of the undefended border -- Economics: Canada as market, and as source of valuable resources; a brief check-list: minerals (metallic and organic). Water. Power. Free trade.

The less obvious reasons: Canada as an Anglo-American country that has begun to solve problems that the U.S. has plainly failed to solve

-- The creation of civilized cities

-- A health care system that works

-- The precarious business of creating a multi-national state. Why the "problem of Quebec" is so important

(2) The obvious reasons that Canada finds the U.S. important--and is preoccupied with American affairs: or, how to sleep with an elephant

-- Some numbers: comparisons between Canada and the U.S. -- National area; size -- Population: size, distribution, and degree of urbanization -- American influence in Canada -- American capital in Canada -- American cultural presence: TV and Canadian nationality

Some basic facts of Canadian political organization: a brief excursion

-- Canada as independent member of the Commonwealth. The British North America Act (1867) as basic constitutional law until 1983 when the "constitution was brought home"

-- Federalism in Canada; contrasts with American forms. Quebec's special role.

-- Multi-nationalism within Canada vs US policies of assimilation; Native rights

-- Territorial status beyond the northern frontier; the idea of permanent frontier

The Making of a Fragmented Canada: the old story of the interaction of geography and history

Physical geography I: Climate, which helps explain why most Canadians live near the U.S. border

-- Canada's anecumene: "The North" and the Rockies

-- Climatic regions of the ecumene, how they differ, and how they are separated

-- The Maritimes and Newfoundland, and their strange role in contemporary Canada. Newfie jokes

-- The St. Lawrence Valley, and its similarity to New England

-- Southern Ontario, and its special position

-- The continental prairies

-- British Columbia's marine-west-coast

Physical geography II: Landforms and their geologic foundation, which help explain some of Canada's internal fragmentation. -- The Canadian Shield, an elementary fact in Canadian politics. The results: the elongate and discontinuous pattern of Canadian population. Permanent difficulties in keeping the country together. The Canadian government's use of public transportation and communication as devices to promote unity.

The emergence of Canada's contemporary human geographic patterns: an historic chronicle

(1) Early explorations in the Maritimes. Forms of settlement. Fishing, and the evolution of the Maritimes as Canada's Appalachia. Depopulation. Isolation.

(2) The French in the St. Lawrence, 1600 and after. The importance of France's early start. Who settled and who didn't, and for what reasons. Forms of settlement. Rural theocratic government, and its resemblance to Boer settlement in South Africa. How the French Revolution cut French Canada off from metropolitan France. Why the French laugh at Canadian French. Origins of the Cajuns.

(3) The American Revolution, and its overwhelming impact on Canadian affairs. Migration of the Loyalists; drawing the boundary between "Upper" and "Lower" Canada, and the persistence of the boundary to the present day. How French Canada was isolated from its only exit into Canada.

(4) The great migrations from Europe, and how they differed from similar migrations to the U.S. Selective migration of Protestant Irish and Scots.

(5) 1867: the British North America Act and Confederation. Railroad building as a political act to counter American westward expansion. (CPRR completed 1885) Quebec's special treatment within the Dominion of Canada. Support of Catholic schools in Quebec with public funds.

(6) Economic expansion--how it resembled that in the U.S., and how it differed. Wheat booms in the Prairies; minerals in the Shield.

(7) The Statute of Westminster (1931). Continuation of Quebec's special role.

(8) The new Constitution. Continuation of Quebec's special role and resentment of it.

The "New Canada"--and the emergence of Quebecois nationalism: some geographic straws in the wind.

-- Demographic changes; growth of French Canadian population. Emigration where?

-- Urbanism and modernism in traditional Quebec (and elsewhere in Canada): the spectacular growth of Canadian cities with Montreal in special position. Rise of liberal urban Catholicism. Trudeau's "new federalism." Expo (1967) and the Olympics (1976), both in Montreal, as symbolic events. Culmination of Quebecois political ambitions with the victory of the P.Q. in the Quebec provincial elections.

An independent Quebec? Failure of the 1980 "independence" referendum 60:40 the 1995 referendum by 50.5:49.5 and possible reprise. What the free trade act with the U.S. may mean. Some editorial speculations.

Canadians have generally not agreed on who they are, only on who they are not: Americans. Will that continue?

News items and miscellanea:

"After criticism by U.S., Mulroney jabs back," NYT 8Mr92, p.15 the prime minister defended Canada's new policy of relying more on UN peacekeeping activities than NATO deterrence to keep a peaceful and secure world. (!) The Canadians have a long and honorable history of contributing troops to UN peacekeeping activities.

"Canada: Nice country nice mess," The Economist 29Jn91 survey. "Even without Quebec's threat to secede, Canada would be examining its navel -- and finding it moving south to the United States...a country with a bigger identity problem than it realizes."

"Don't cry for Canada -- we'll pick up the pieces," The Washington Post, 17Jn90, outlook section. Joel Garreau, author of The Nine Nations of North America and a descendant of 10 generations of French Canadians talks (sort of) tongue in cheek about prospects of the U.S. picking up desirable pieces of our northern neighbor as it breaks up.

"Canada and the United States in the year 2092," NYT 21Oc92, p.a23 shows a tongue in cheek (sort of?) map of our part of the world a hundred years hence. Worth looking at for laughs and for more sober reflection.