GEOGRAPHY 128. INTERNATIONALAFFAIRS Class pack part I. (intro-Europe) 73 pages

GEOGRAPHY 128 GEOGRAPHY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Anthony V. Williams,
Penn State University 324 Walker Bldg; 865-2493; avw@psuvm
Office Hours: 10:30-11:30 MW, 1:30-3:15 TU OR APPOINTMENT or DROP IN

The purpose of Geography 128 is to examine the linkage between geography and international politics. By "geography," I do not mean just physical geography, although physical geography certainly plays an important role in international affairs. The course is also, indeed mainly, concerned with human geography--the patterns and changes in nationality, distribution and density of populations, of languages, ethnic groups, of religions, of wealth and poverty, of disease--any quality of human populations which varies from place to place and over time and which has a bearing on international affairs.

Two basic arguments run through the course: first, that the ambitions of nation-states, and consequently much of their political behavior, rises from a complex interaction of geography and history. We are unlikely to make much sense out of national behavior unless we know something about that history and geography, and how they fit together. Second, the course argues that the geographic facts-of-life often impose semi-permanent constraints on what a nation-state can do--regardless of what its government wishes to do. Most of the political trouble that we read about in the newspaper, both internal and international, can be understood better if it is examined now and then through geographic spectacles. It is the purpose of Geography 128 to do that.

In one semester, it is obviously impossible to cover the earth, and we shall make no attempt to do so. (Indeed, at the rate that conflicts arise and spread in the modern world, we cannot even cover all the political hot-spots.) Instead, we will take a look at a sampling of the world's nation-states. Most examples are chosen because they are chronic trouble-spots (like the Middle East), or because they have very recently caused trouble (like Japan). In each instance, we will try to identify the various ways that geography has helped fuel the fires of international conflict. There are also nations with a relatively high level of political stability, and there also geography plays an important role (Great Britain and the USA are prime examples).

In order to get a fair coverage of the world's main cultural regions, our sampling includes a pair of examples from each of the main continents. Again, to get as much variety as possible, each pair includes polar opposites in terms of economic development, or political stability, or cultural character. Thus, in Asia, we will take a look at South Asia--economically underdeveloped, with a history of colonial exploitation, and torn by internal rages--and contrast it with Japan, one of the world's richest nations and one of Asia's most stable political units. (That has not always been so. Japan was one of the world's chief trouble makers for the half-century before World War II--and was single-handedly responsible for changing the whole map of east Asia and the western Pacific). A similar pairing can be seen in the following list, except in the Middle East and Anglo-America, where only one sample is taken: from Africa --Nigeria and South Africa; from Asia --Sri Lanka and Japan; Israel and its neighbors in the "Middle East"; Britain and Germany from Europe, Mexico, the islands and Canada from the Americas. If time permits, we will discuss the United States, as affected by geography as any country.

Although the great powers--Russia, the US, China, and India--do not appear explicitly on the list above (until the very end), we will not ignore them. The reason is obvious. In considering the political geography of Japan, for example, it is impossible to avoid discussing either China or Russia, just as Mexican affairs make little sense if the US is ignored. Thus, while we will focus mainly on the places listed above from 1 to 10, we will digress frequently to consider the politics and geography of the great powers. By the end of the course, we will touch on nearly all areas of the world, at least occasionally.

Just as we range widely across geographic space, we will make frequent forays into the historic past. There is compelling reason for doing so: many political problems of the present can be traced directly to past events, and the geography of the present descends directly from the geography of the past. There are innumerable examples of that fact in contemporary political affairs. the problems of present-day South Africa, for instance, have been under construction for about three centuries, and we will necessarily be forced to review some elementary facts of South African history before we can understand present-day South African geography and politics. And, as we look closely at other parts of the world, we will find that is true everywhere. History lays a heavy hand on present-day affairs--and geography.

I have taught the course without a text because none seemed to quite fit. Last year, based on student suggestions in 1994, we used H. De Blij and P. Muller, Geography: Realms, Regions, and Concepts. The concensus was that the text was not worth the money although some liked it a lot. I am planning to put some basic texts on reserve for background reading and will inform you when they are available. But the major resource is a set of class lecture notes available at the university bookstore on or before the second week of classes. [I do not make any money from these!]

We do require use of two atlases. The general one is Goode's World Atlas in its latest edition. [For some purposes the 18th edition is adequate but it does not, for instance, have 1990s economic data nor does it reflect the remaking of Eurasia after the collapse of the former Soviet Union.] Bring your atlas to class with you! We will be talking about the location of places, and how those locations relate to each other and to current political affairs. the most efficient way to talk about locational matters, of course, is to have a map in front of you. You will find the atlas helpful in following lectures (some will be impossible to follow without the atlas). By the end of the term, I hope that you will think highly enough of GOODE'S to keep it in your personal library permanently, just as you would keep a dictionary. The other atlas is the cheapest historical atlas, Hammond's Historical Atlas. It is not so necessary here to get the latest edition although my page references in class will be to that. We cannot talk about the problems of Africa, Asia or Europe, indeed even the Americas, without knowing at least in a basic way how today's map developed from yesterday's. Should you be able to afford it, or have a birthday coming up, the best general historical atlas in English is the Times Historical Atlas of the World which merges good quality maps and text to help make historical geography live.

You will also need to read a good daily newspaper in order to keep abreast of current international affairs. There are only a few really good newspapers printed in the US, but the most widely read, widely respected, and easily available in State College is the NEW YORK TIMES. I will sometimes use TIMES stories as a basis for lectures, and there will always be an exam section based on them. You can read the TIMES in the library, or you can buy it on any newsstand in town for $1/ a copy. Or, you can take advantage of a special deal for students and get a Monday-through-Friday subscription for a price substantially below the newsstand price. I will have subscription forms in class and they're also available around campus, notably at the HUB.

Your grades will be based on the best two of three exams, part takehome, worth 66 percent; a term paper/project of which we will talk soon, worth 29 percent, and a combination of attendance and a short early paper, worth 5 percent. To minimize exam trauma, you will find exam previews and examples of previous exams within the course packet.

The first week will start off with your taking an ungraded quiz covering locations and some basic factual information. Your answers will give me a clue as to how to tailor the course to your backgrounds. To give me an idea of how you write and think, I will have you write a couple of pages analyzing the results of (a sample of answers to) the quiz. You will be given results from an earlier class or course to give you some perspective on how your group's answers compare. Numbers are only good when there is a framework to evaluate them.

We will spend one or two periods talking about maps, their uses, and some problems relating to their use. If you've already had a geography course, some of this material may not be new -- I apologize but most of the class will not have had the chance to think about maps. Then we will start looking at world problem areas, beginning with the one that, unless this class is unique, is least known -- Africa.

In addition to outlining the points I want to make, the following notes contain summaries of recent accounts of events in "our" countries and regions, mostly from the New York Times and The Economist. Unless you read the specialized literature, these two sources are good ones. Realize that like everything else, newspapers and journals have their predilections and biases. The Times tries hard to be objective about most topics, the Economist is a little less worried about giving its own slant. In that, it is like most newspapers and weeklies throughout the world [but closer to American standards than most]. The coverage of Africa and Asia is more recent and voluminous than that for the rest. This is largely to get you used to thinking about what kinds of articles you should look at as you build your own knowledge base of current happenings.

"Grossly distorted picture," Economist, 5Fe94,p.79. Despite big improvements in national-income accounting, statisticians still hold up a distorting mirror to the world's economies. New System of National Accounts (SNA) replaces 1968 formulation. Will make international comparisons easier. Takes changes in world's economy and accounting practices into account. Improves accounting for inflation and measurement of trade flows. Still ignores multinational nature of many modern firms. Dissenters say defining trade based on ownership rather than location would make more sense. A recent US DOC study shows major differences. In 1991 US had 28 billion goods and services deficit. If net sales by foreign subsidiaries were included, deficit would become a $24 billion surplus. NAS group suggests moving entirely to ownership basis. If so exports would =crossborder sales to foreigners + net sales to foreigners by subsidiaries abroad + sales by American firms to American subsidiaries of foreign firms. If adopted, this would have pushed America's trade surplus to $164 billion.

"Back to the Future," Economist, 8Jn94, 21-22. A strong America, an advancing China, a struggling Russia and an uncertain Europe make up the new quartet of big powers. The interplay of their intersts and the threat of proliferation will fix the rudiments of the next world order.

"Verification, Validation, and Confirmation of Numerical Models in the Earth Sciences," Naomi Oreskes, Kristin Schrader-Frechette, Kenneth Belitz, Science 273)4Fe94,641-646. Earth Sciences and History, Dartmouth; Philosophy, University of S. Florida, Tampa; Earth Sciences, Dartmouth. Abstract: Verification and validation of numerical models of natural systems is impossible. This is because natural systems are never closed and because model results are always non-unique. Models can be confirmed by the demonstration of agreement between observation and prediction, but confirmation is inherently partial. Complete confirmation is logically precluded by the fallacy of affirming the consequent and by incomplete access to natural phenomena. Models can only be evaluated in relative terms and their predictive value is always open to question. The primary value of models is heuristic.

"The Great Reshuffle," William Safire, NYT 1Fe93, a19 (Op-Ed) talks about national separatism and its potential impacts. "They're rioting in Africa, as the old song goes; throughout that continent, warring tribes are ripping apart the once-secure borders of nationhood...The specter of national separation is haunting Europe, too; Dissolution worked out peacefully in the former Soviet empire, but breaking-up is proceeding with ancient savagery in the former Yugoslavia...This illustrates the central political fact of the post-Communist world: Peoples who are the ethnic majority in any given area are reshuffling the deck of nations...Is this a bad thing? Should today's great powers try to stop this trend and enforce old borders laid out by previous great powers after world wars?" Safire says these standards are under consideration by "Agitators for the Conceptual Frameworkers Union."

1. When a large majority of people in a region are of one ethnic group; when those people are politcally repressed or culturally stifled by a different gorup in control of that region -- then the maltreated local majority has a moral call on the world to aid in its self-determination.

2. Granting local autonomy to minorities within an etablished state is a good way of defusing power kegs; a central government can still instill national pride in a minority by offering home rule.

3. When local groups competing for the same area cannot get along, the idea of cantons -- self-governing enclaves based on ethnicity, long successful in Switzerland -- offers a good transition to federal democracy.

4. Some reshuffling along ethnic lines is necessary now to keep people from one another's throats, but in nation-building neatness does not count.

"Why are Britain, France and the U.S. struggling with the moral imperative of intervention while Germany and Japan callously turn away? Because multiracial, multicultural nations are more trained to tolerance and directed by conscience than nations of less varied makeup."

NOTE: The discussion falls into two parts: an introduction, where we examine the background of contemporary trouble, with special emphasis on the patterns left by European colonialism--followed by a case-study of NIGERIA, a newly-independent black African state which has seen an extraordinary amount of political trouble since the British left in 1960, a country which epitomizes the difficulties of many contemporary states in sub-Saharan black Africa.) and SOUTH AFRICA.

A region, long isolated from outside affairs, that was suddenly dragged into the "modern" world--rapidly, and quite incompletely--by Europeans-- British, Germans, French, Belgians who set about manipulating African affairs (including geography) to suit their own 19th century motives--freezing political patterns that had been in rapid flux, introducing radical changes in economic and social affairs, and stimulating dangerous changes in population. And where, consequently, when Europeans suddenly departed after World War II, local populations were left to cope with new geographies which were not of their own making, and which they were ill-equipped to manage. (We will note numerous analogues with the situation in South Asia).

1. Africans vs. outsiders: expulsion of Europeans. Subsequent great-power collisions in African vacuums. (similarities with South - and Southeast Asia).

2. Conflicts between African states. Discordances between African states. Discordances between nations and states. Nomadism. The persistence of border disputes.

3. Conflicts and catastrophes within African states. So far the major problem in the era of independence. Civil wars between national groups. Disasters in non-viable states. The rapid disappearance of democratic forms of government; the rise of authoritarian regimes. The jury is still out on whether recent moves towards more democratic and accountable systems (multiparty systems, contested elections) will succeed or last long.

4. Racial confrontation. Except for conflict between locals and the ethnic groups from the Levant and Indian subcontinent who control retail sector among others, not so obvious a problem as in, say, the USA. Africans realize that ultimately, they are in charge of their countries. [Some academics still rail against the "new" imperialism and multinationals.] There is still conflict between black and white in areas where Europeans settled; from least to greatest problems -- Kenya, Zimbabwe, South Africa. Main consideration of racial troubles will be deferred to the discussion of South Africa).

The heritage of European colonialization. Liberia as the only African state to escape European occupation. (Ethiopia as a near-miss).

The curiously spasmodic nature of European penetration, and why it happened that way. The three periods of penetration.

I. Penetration before the Age of Discoveries by Europeans and Mediterranean people. Ancient Greek and Roman penetration: why the Nile was so extraordinarily important. Arab invasions and migrations: the importance of the semi-arid fringes of the Sahara. "The Great Sudan," and the analogue with the steppes of central Asia as routes of migration. Trans-Saharan routes, and the slave trade.

II. Coastal colonization by the "new Europeans." Prince Henry and his followers. Paradoxical avoidance of the interior, despite the persistent presence of wealthy and powerful political units. Examples, esp. in the Ethiopian highlands, West Africa, and the Rift Valley. Why Europeans stuck mainly to the coast until the late 19th century, and why it makes a difference in contemporary African affairs.

-- The coast itself, and why Europeans found it hard to cope with. The shape of the coast: anchorages, fresh water, and physical safety.

-- The difficulties in getting inland. Escarpments and falls. The example of the Congo(now Zaire) river.

-- Climate and vegetation: Persistent European difficulty in coping with unfamiliar environments. Prevalence of disease, some known (malaria) some not. European perceptions of what constituted a "correct" environment, and how the African coast failed to meet expectations. Why the voyage from Europe to Capetown seemed (and was) so long.

III. The burst of colonization of the 1880s, why it took the form it did, and its profound influence on the geography of politics in contemporary Africa.

1. The rush inland. The main contenders, and the particular animosity between England and France. Hints of mineral wealth. The collision in the Sudan and elsewhere.

2. The Congress of Berlin (1884-85) and the freezing of Africa. What Bismark did (and what Germany got as a result). The basic geography of British and French imperial dominions in Africa. Where the other European powers fitted in. The Dutch. Portugal's fossil "empire." Italian fiascos.

3. What the Europeans tried to do, and what they did. (Analogues with Southeast Asia).

-- Forms of economic development. Plantations: West African examples. Transportation lines: example of the Angola-Katanga railroad.

-- The gradual discovery of African mineral wealth. Gold and precious gems. The copper belt and strategic metals. The slow-dying myth that Africa was deficient in fossil fuels.

-- Demographic effects--largely unintentional. White settlement in central Africa. The import of overseas Indians in East and South Africa. Seeds of the population explosion.

IV. The end of colonial rule (1945-1975). The basic question of how to make a nation-state where none existed before. The example of NIGERIA.

Portugal was the European country that pioneered the overseas exploration, beginning with the islands and Africa, that eventually gave the continent the world. For reasons such as Venetian dominance of the eastern trade and blockages of trade by troubles in the east, efforts to find new routes to the fabled Indies sped up in the 1400s. Portugal was the place where these efforts crystallized. (Spain might have been, as it was later, an equally good choice. But it was still engaged in the end stages of the Reconquista -- expulsion of the Moors. And their last redoubts were in the south, exactly the place with the best acces to the Atlantic.)

Development in ship and sail design and navigation were encouraged by Prince Henry the Navigator. Financing for expeditions was available from Venice's Italian rival city states, from the Flemish and others. Madeira was occupied in 1420, the Azores rediscovered in 1430, and between 1433 and 1482 black Africa's coast from Cape Bojador to the Congo river was opened for trade and control at critical points. According to Fernand Braudel (The Perspective of the World: Civilization and Capitalism 15th=18th Century. Volume 3. New York: Harper & Row, 1982) Africa provided ivory, malagueta (a pepper), gold (about 14,000 ounces a year on average) and slaves (1000 a year in the 1450s, rising to 3000 a year soon after). Portugal claimed a monopoly on trade with Africa, signing a treaty in 1479 with Spain that presaged the 1494 Treaty or Tordesillas that divided the non-European world between the two. The returns were good, gold giving a profit of 400 to 500 percent. By 1488, Vasco da Gama established that a sea passage existed between the Atlantic and Indian Ocean. Given that certainty is it surprising that the Portuguese turned down Columbus with his risky proposition to sail west to discover the Indies? Still, they could have had it all!

Disease -- from Oliver Ransford, Let the Sickness Cease. London: John Murray, 1983.

In the 18th century, between 25-75 percent of white newcomers died in their first year on the Guinea Coast. p.54

Between 1804 and 1825 more than 60 percent of church missionaries in Africa died of disease. p.54

Between 1822 and 1830, of 1568 soldiers in one detachment in W. Africa, 1298 died there of "climatic fever", 125 died on the voyage home, and half of the survivors died of tropical disease after returning to England; only 57 were discharged as "fit." pp. 54-55.

The Royal Navy anti-slavery squadron (patrolling W. African coastal waters, AVW) was known as "The Coffin Squadron." Bathurst, Gambia was known colloquially as "half die." p. 55.

Among the most pernicious diseases is sleeping sickness. Its long term effects on health and vitality may have been a major reason for the western view of Africans as being slackers and dumb. p.127.

Ransford associates population movement with increases in mortality, "new" diseases, etc. p.73. If this is so, the introduction of new all weather roads, for instance, may not be an unalloyed blessing!

Population declines after European contact are well known in the American case. Ransford says similar things happened in Africa as the Europeans penetrated the interior and colonized. For instance, in the Belgian Congo (current name, Zaire) population estimates are: 1880 40 million; 1910 15.5 million; 1933 9.25 million. In French West Africa population estimates are: 1911 20 million; 1921 7.5 million; 1931 2.5 million; 1936 3.5 million. p. 76. If these numbers are true and representative, the current "population explosion" in Africa may only be returning numbers to previous levels.

While it is often a source to be used with caution, there is a very interesting special report "The Agony of Africa" in TIME, September 7, 1992, pages 40-53. It may not give all the background necessary to interpret the facts but does cover corruption, economic growth problems, population explosion and urbanization problems, starvation, and refugee problems. There is also a section on Somalia and two pages on an African-American perspective on Africa.

"Africa: a Flicker of Light," from the Economist, 5 Mr 94, p. 21 says that economic reforms and a new political realism are getting some results but there are big obstacles to recovery --to living standards of the early 1970s. [Even the Economist makes mistakes. See if you can find one in the map in this article.] One problem is that people, especially in cities where reporters are around to describe things, are angry about rising prices of (sometimes heavily subsidized goods like food or even gasoline), and are ready to take to the street to protest and riot. Uganda, Ghana, Ethiopia and Eritrea are spotlighted as places where leaders are willing to take responsibility rather than blame the west for all their troubles.

"Doctor discovers the right medicine for Ghana," Howard W. French, NYT 8 De 95, A4 talks about the good and bad experiences of Emmanuel Tuffour, who returned to Ghana to open a modern clinic after being a doctor in Cleveland, USA. A major problem was encounter with ancestral values and Ghana's old socialist ideas. He believes in individual responsibiity and effort but has been swarmed on by relatives, long lost kin and others demanding jobs or free care. And well off people have come to his clinic demanding treatment for which they refuse to pay.

"Political chaos in Zaire disrupts efforts to control AIDS epidemic," Kenneth B. Noble, NYT, 22 Mr 94, D1 says the epidemic in Zaire is accelerating; hospitals say up to 80 percent of patients are infected with HIV. There's worry that the country's rate of infection may exceed that in East African countries like Uganda and Rwanda, the hardest hit so far by the virus.

"Where Uganda and Kenya collide," Donatella Lorch, NYT, 2 Ap 94, 4 talked of the situation in Busia, the border town where much of the official trade between the countries passes. As it says, 75 percent of Uganda's imports come through Kenya and it's been under pressure from the larger neighbor to conform to its wishes.

"Africa's economies: Reforms Pay off," Thomas L. Friedman, NYT, 13 Mr 94, 18 discusses a World Bank report that said that African countries which had adopted suggested reforms involving tough austerity measures had better performance than those that hadn't. Critics have noted since that the austerity measures affect the middle class and the worst off. More advanced regions and ethnic groups will cement their advantage over more backward areas and peoples.

"An Ice Age Nudge for Human Evolution in Africa," Science, 264(14 JA 94), 173-174 reports on research by Peter Menocal of Columbia's Lamont-Doherty Laboratory that ice age swings in the northern hemisphere may have created the conditions necessary for the evolution of hominids by turning the climate in African savannah areas cooler and dryer.

"French held the strings in Africa: top aide's memoir shows a dark side," Howard W. French, NYT, 28 Fe 95, A14 discusses Jacques Foccart's memoir indicating he was a "puppeteer" in ex-colonies in Africa. Leaders not friendly enough were frozen out (of aid, etc.), others eliminated. "...Africans..sadness over the ease with which their leaders were manipulated, more often to satisfy French interests than to address the needs of their own countries...Nowhere..more true than in the Central African Republic where..the French-installed dictator Jean-Bedel Bokassa...insisted on calling de Gaulle "Papa." The French view(ed) American interest in Africa as scarcely more acceptable than that of the Soviet Union. "Coup leader expects surrender." AP, CDT, 5 Oc 95, 7A talks of Bob Denard's latest escapade where he surrendered after being cornered by French commandos after taking over the country. "End of an Affair," The Economist, 12 Au 95, 35-36 says "France is reconsidering its long love affair with its former African colonies" largely due to the fact that they are costing too much to support at a time when French finances are under strain. "France has always regarded its francophone 'commonwealth' in Africa as part of its ticket to world-power status." The French give money, arms, support against coups of which they disapprove, technicians; in exchange they get prestige, a cushy set of jobs for French expatriates, and extraordinary privileges for their enterprises, especially oil companies.

"Blood and earth," The Economist, 23 Se 95, 16-17 talks about whether multi-ethnic countries, given the lessons of Rwanda and Burundi as well as Bosnia can ever be harmonious. They are pessimistic, talking about returns to peace only after partition and enforcement of greater homogeneity. But they note some success stories. Still, multi-ethnic states are fragile.

"Malaria's genetic game of cloak and dagger," Natalie Angier, NYT, 22 Aug 95, C1-, discusses recent findings, including the fact that the malaria parasite has an evolutionary "strategy" of changing some signature proteins to fool the immune system -- and drugs. I remember as recently as the 1970s optimistic talk about eradicating malaria using DDT to control the mosquitos transmitting the parasite and chloroquine to treat already infected people. The fantasy that infectious diseases were on the verge of being conquered has been revealed as such with tuberculosis, cholera, pneumonias among others now back on the "killer" list.

African news is scarce in U.S. media and focuses on the problems not the successes. That's one reason African leaders and intelligentsia supported the 1970s proposal for a New World Information Order. But the NYT is better than others. On Nigeria, for instance you should read "Nigeria reveals census' total, 88.5 million, and little more" NYT, 3/25/92, p.12. On South Africa, you will see more reports than on most African countries (except the one with the most current disaster). An example of interest is "From die-hard camps, the roll of the war drums" NYT, 28/12/92, p.a4.

"Africa's economies: Reforms pay off," NYT 13Mr94 P18, Thomas L. Friedman discusses world bank classification of African nations' GDP change based on how well or poorly they did in macroeconomic policy. Those who reformed generally did better. Looked at 29 sub=Saharan economies in two periods 1981-86 = economic crisis and 1987-1991 when all introduced economic reforms. Those who'd done the tough work earlier did better.

SOUTH AFRICA. "South Africa confronts rapid spread of AIDS," NYT 16Mr93, a1,a6 says that by the end of the dedcade, 3 million, more than 10 percent of the adult population(!) will carry the virus and 160,000 will have AIDS. Five years later about one in four adults will have antibodies to HIV. About 3/4 of the national health budget will be needed said a study by the Medical Research Council.

ERITREA. "Onions potatoes and T-54s," Economist 20Mr93, p.52 speculates that the feeling of national identity may have been forged by the 30 year war with Ethiopia. Eritreans are mixed: nine main groups with their own languages and split about equally between Muslims and Christians. Muslims are lowlanders, Christians highlanders. Tensions exist. EPLF governs; Muslim Eritrean Liberation Front once in vanguard. To minimize tensions, schoolchildren over 11 now taught in English.

ANGOLA. "A new crisis engulgs Angola as the rebels make big gains," Keneth B. Noble, NYT, 29Ja93, a1 500,000 or so have died already in the war. but in the last 3 weeks tens of thousands have died in the most intense fighting. Millions have been forced from their homes and 1.5 million face starvation. "Savimbi wants the whole and in his position, with most of the country effectively under his control why should he compromise" said a western diplomat.

"Angolan president says his forces are rearming after rebel gains," Kenneth B. Noble, NYT 2Fe93 a5 reports President Jose Eduardo dos Santos saw no defeat but no early end to fighting with UNITA. Accused UNITA of receiving aid from South Africa and in recent weeks from Zaire.

"Soldiers battle for food in besiged Angola city," Kenneth B. Noble, NYT 25Mr93 a12 talks of troubles of the UN food distribution services in Malanje near Luanda. Food is still plentiful in the capital.

"Angolan rebels rebound within reach of a victory," Kenneth B. Noble, NYT 13Ap93 a1 says that after a major government offensive where officials in Luanda were predicting imminent collapse of UNITA, things have swung back.

"UN brokered peace talks fail to achieve cease-fire in Angola," NYT 22My93, p5 after the US recognition of the MPLA government. Neither side can defeat the other, both want peace, but there's too much distrust according to a western diplomat. Fewer than 500 observers were available for last year's elections and the budget was only a quarter of what is had been for Namibia, one fifth of the population.

"Angola rebels seize oil center and old base," NYT 21Ja93, p.a5 discusses the renewed civil war. The US supported, Jonas Savimbi led, UNITA did not win the UN-sponsored election as it expected and reopened hostilities. After being thrown out of the capital, Luanda, and apparently losing their capital at Huambo in central Angola, UNITA retook Huambo and seized a petroleum production center in the oil rich area on the Atlantic coast north of Luanda.

"62 dead after Angolan rampage of rape and murder of Zaireans," NYT 24Ja93, p.16 reports on reactions of Angolans in the capital, Luanda, to reports that Zaire was helping UNITA rebels. The UN brokered peace settlement in 1991 that supposedly ended 16 years of civil war broke down after the UNITA rebels rejected the results of a national election (reported fair by UN observers).

"Angola says it shot down South Africa transport plane," NYT 24Ja93, p.16 reports the government claim of shooting down an RSA transport flying out of Jamba, former southern base of the UNITA rebel movement. A South African spokesman denied one of its planes was down and that his government was helping the rebels.

"Ghanaian vice-President attacked by President," BBC World Service, 29 De 95 reported that vice-President Akah had complained to police that he had been attacked by the President, Jerry Rawlings, at a cabinet meeting. He'd been complaining about corruption problems involving the President when he was punched in the face and kicked several times in the groin. His account was confirmed by some cabinet colleagues.

When it achieved independence from Britain on October 1, 1960, Nigeria was widely thought of by outsiders as the hope of Africa. It had had a peaceful transition to independence and a sufficiency of agricultural and mineral resources. The human resources included a decently trained and experienced civil service, an educated elite trained in British universities or at the University of Ibadan, and a small professional army. There were several political parties rather than the one often found in newly independent states. The 1952 British conducted census revealed a population of 35 million by far the largest in black Africa, so there was a decent sized internal market for industry. Both Time and Newsweek trumpeted this new giant. Yet the post independence history has been depressing, for Nigerians and their friends.

Theme 1: It is difficult for outsiders to evaluate an area. When success looks inevitable to them, it is time to be cautious.

Theme 2: A political, educational, and economic structure imposed from outside is likely to create problems unless it is a good "fit" to prevailing conditions. A long period of "tutelage" can make such imposed structures seem more natural, but they may still founder.

Theme 3: Multi-ethnic and multi-lingual states need a strong set of countervailing forces to keep them together. In the best of circumstances these should include a decent economy with shares for all, a set of icons like a glorious history of shared struggle, martyrs and wise men among the founding fathers, and recognized but hopefully low level of external threats.

Theme 4: The kinds of people who were the "elite" in colonial times may not be the right ones to run a country after independence. But they usually self select themselves for that purpose.

Theme 5: Countries put together by outsiders are often not a good natural "fit." There are likely to be strong regional conflicts. Regional conflict incidentally is quite common. Our civil war, the separatist movements in Europe and the north-south split in China are 3 examples out of many.

Theme 6: Being a "favored race" of the former colonizing power is often not an enviable status once independence is achieved. Ibos in Nigeria and Sikhs in India are just two of numberous cases that could be cited. The fact that such groups tend to be minorities increases their problems.

Theme 7: Discovery of "wealth" or a quick jump in prices of a commodity may mean disaster rather than development. Iran, Mexico and Nigeria all are still suffering from the oil price rise bonanza of the 1970s.

The atlas provides some basic facts. The Statesman's Yearbook can be consulted for the current situation. And the accompanying maps should also help in gaining an overall geographic perspective.

Geography: The boundaries of present day Nigeria were imposed by the British after negotiations with the neighboring colonial powers France and Germany. Nonetheless, one can see a basic "sense" in a country formed largely around the drainage basins of the Niger-Benue. One might also ask whether these might not also serve to delineate 3 countries rather than 1. The map shows a country with a gentle rise in elevation proceeding from the coast inland and two major upland areas, the Jos and Mambilla plateaus. This looks and is easier to penetrate and provide transport over than many African countries. A closer look would reveal obstacles that have been significant starting with the mangrove swamps and dense coastal forests.

A "belt" -- the so-called Middle Belt -- in central Nigeria puzzled the colonialists, because it had fewer people and settlements than areas to the south or north. Extensions of this belt are found to the east and west of Nigeria. For quite a while it was ascribed to natural conditions. Its cause is actually historical, the incursions of the Islamic Fulani horsemen from the north in jihads in the 1700s and 1800s. In essence, this is a classic political-geographic "shatterbelt."

Resources: gold and slaves were sought early. The gold proved skimpier than hoped and the slave trade ended officially in 1815. The colonial powers always looked for mineral resources. In Nigeria the British exploited the tin of the Jos Plateau and the coal around Enugu. Both have been eclipsed in importance by the petroleum (even bigger natural gas resources not currently significant -- flared off mostly) in the Niger delta and offshore.

Agricultural resources originally were a major attraction. These included the cocoa of the southwest, cotton and groundnuts (peanuts) of the north, and oil palm of the southeast. Firms like Cadbury and Lever Bros. Were important in their early exploitation. There have been fitful attempts to grow and exploit rubber east of Benin.

Multinationals have been prominent in African economies. In Nigeria, major players include the United Africa Company, Lever Brothers and Shell.

History: The history of Nigeria did not start with the British! On the northern borders were impressive empires such as Songhai and Bornu that engaged in trading with the Mediterranean and the Arab world. ["Morocco" leather was based on hides from west Africa's savannah.] In the southwest was the unique Oyo civilization with its classical center at Ile-Ife and a number of vibrant urban centers. And the kingdom of Benin was renowned throughout and outside West Africa. Relatively recently, traces of interesting civilizations have been found in the southeast. But the impact of the British has been critical in forming the modern country of NIgeria.

Nigeria was part of the old slave and gold coast and a number of European countries had trading posts and forts there. But the British established dominance in the 1800s. In particular, they focused their power on Lagos, the best site to use as a harbor for their efforts to suppress the slave trade after 1815. In 1853, Lagos was made a Protectorate.

The British did not have much luck persuading the local population to help them administer the area. The climate was not such as to attract Britons. And there was considerable reluctance on the part of the native Yorubas to accept these foreigners as having a superior culture and so emulating them. The British solution, as happened elsewhere was to import a "client group," in this case returned slaves from Sierra Leone, to serve as their agents and civil servants. Many of these people's descendants are still prominent in the Lagos area and at the national level. The regard in which these folk with their adopted British ways were held can be apprehended by the term applied to them by a prominent Nigerian academic -- "deluded hybrids." Other groups filtered in to dominate smaller retail trade, from the eastern Mediterranean (Cyprus, Lebanon) and India.

Other points of penetration were Bonny and Calabar in the east and Warri and Sapele in the center. The push north began as a reaction to the fear of French penetration from Senegal eastward and even up the Niger. It was tough going. But by the first decade of this century, the task of forming Nigeria was done. Originally, the south and north were governed separately. The British, unlike other colonial powers, liked to rule through the native elite unless there were rich resources locally. In many areas of their Empire, they never expected or wanted to stay forever, unlike the French or Portuguese, and indirect rule fitted in well with this philosophy. Especially in the north, they found this an efficient arrangement in Nigeria. Why, then, is Nigeria one country rather than two, or three? Administrative convenience and the sense of "tidiness" of the colonial administrator, Lord Lugard.

Britain after WW II started to seriously plan independence for many of its territories. Places that had given trouble and the parts not favored by British settlers were first on the list. A number of constitutional meetings were held to plan the future nature of the independent countries. Asian possessions (except Hong Kong) went first, later Africa and the Americas. In West Africa, Ghana was felt most ready economically and in terms of its elite to receive indepedence and got it in 1956. Nigeria waited until 1960. Perhaps the major reason for the delay was the reluctance of the northern, Islamic, elite to see the British leave. They had kept a lot of their powers and there were few missionaries and the accompanying western education. They feared independence, too soon, would expose them to a "takeover" by "more advanced" southerners. As it turns out, northerners have dominated national politics because of their population weight; but they have depended heavily on allies from the south -- sometimes eastern Ibos, sometimes western Yorubas along with Christians from the middle belt -- to run the country.

The Political System since independence has had some constancies and some changes. The British, as they did elsewhere but not in their own country, left a federal system embedded in a parliamentary one. Originally there were three states -- north, west, and east. The association of these with the three major ethnic groups and the dominance of the northern state in population led to fears of one dominating. So over the years the number of states has grown to 31 as the original three have been split. The south still fears the north's population,islamic faith and political dominance; the north still distrusts the Christian and better educated south. When the army decided to return to the barracks in the 1970s they called a constitutional committee together. It set up a strong presidential system, rather like that of the United States. That worked no better than the parliamentary one between 1979-1983. But it will be tried again. Emulating the American arrangement, thehead of state between 1983-1994, General Babangida,decreed that there will be two political parties -- one slightly right of center, one just left of center. In light of our own discussions of limited terms for office holders, it may be interested to know that all former office holders including the incumbents were forbidden to run again [this ban was later lifted]. In the event, elections were held but then annulled and the Yoruba (southwesterner) moslem who won the presidency has been in jail since he (maybe foolishly) decided to return to Nigeria to claim fruits of victory after spending a period of exile in Britain. The current head of state, General Sani Abacha, has a long history of involvement in previous coups and, perhaps based on his own experience, has cracked down harshly on dissent. While nominally starting the process for a return to civilian rule (by 1998?), he has hanged or otherwise disposed of dissident elements and critics.

The Urban System in colonial countries is usually influenced by the needs of the outsiders. That is true in Nigeria, as a famous geographer, Akin Mabogunje, has written. Some towns, like Kaduna and Enugu, were created from scratch -- for administrative and mining purposes respectively. Others, like Ibadan, grew under colonialism. Still others, bypassed by the transport system built under colonialism, lost importance relatively or absolutely. Lagos, like other colonial capitals, became the dominant town. In most cases as in this one, a geographer could suggest a better balanced urban system. The key difference between city systems created in colonial and noncolonial systems is that the former reflect (capitalist) economic rationality much less.

The Transport System is likewise skewed by the administrative and economic needs of the external (metropolitan is a term often used) power. Taafe, Morrill and Gould in a classic 1962 paper describe stages in transport development in colonial societies. There is a focus first on coastal points of control and ingress. The routes are then pushed inland to areas needing quick access to put down potential unrest, secondarily perhaps to areas of attractive resources. Finally, some attention is paid to cross-connecting these routes. Over time, but it is often a long time, differential development becomes based on economic returns. In Nigeria, the threads of the colonial system are still very obvious. There are the railway lines from Lagos through Ibadan to Kaduna for administrative control purposes and to bring out cotton and peanuts from the north; off this is a spur to the Jos tin mines. The eastern line to the coal at Enugu also has a spur to Jos. The major road system, denser because roads cost less and are more flexible, has similar colonial antecedents.

Like Alaska and Siberia with their permafrost, roads in tropical areas subject to heavy seasonal downpours need to be ballasted heavily. Otherwise they can wash out in one rainy season. In Nigeria and many other black African countries this is usually not done. Reasons include lack of money and "siphoning" of money from road construction to political pockets. On my first stay in Nigeria in the 1970s, a contractor who should know told me that the kickback to officials varied regionally but was usually 25 percent in the south and up to 50 percent in the north. A thin smooth coat of asphalt is usually enough to get a road approved for payment. [Some roads financed by the World Bank which knows of these problems are shining exceptions to the generally deteriorating streets and highways.] Some recent estimates say that 75 percent of the income from oil exports since 1973 has been illegally diverted in one way or another.

The Economic System in third world countries has been described by many authors. Among the most interesting commentators are W. Arthur Lewis, Joan Robinson, E. Wallerstein, Michael Watts and Gunder Frank. The major and obvious point is that the "modern" economies in these countries were designed for the benefits of outsiders. This has meant focus on commercial rather than food crops, "factory" or plantation agriculture with docile or skilled labor brought from outside if locals were unwilling or unable to serve efficiently, extraction but not much processing of raw materials and generally unbalanced industrial growth. This can take decades to change. Before the civil war in 1967, the major locations of "modern" employment were Lagos, the capital, and in the southeastern palm oil and petroleum centers. This pattern persisted through the 1970s and even by 1990 had been little changed if one excepts growth of government workers in the state capitals.

Firms from the colonizing countries dominated the modern sector. The United Africa Company, Shell and Lever Brothers have been mentioned above. They have parallels in other colonial countries' territories in Africa, in South and Central America, India and Southeast Asia. In Africa in particular, enterprises run by outsiders from the same colonial system took up what opportunities were left by the multinationals. Thus the Indians and Pakistanis and Greek Cypriots in British colonies, the Lebanese and Syrians in the French. In southeast Asia, the Chinese filled those outsider roles more than anyone else. Reaction of Africans after independence was often to try to control or oust (Uganda, Kenya, Nigeria) these "scavengers of colonialism" as some Nigerian friends called them. With the multinationals, the Nigerians went so far as to mandate "Nigerianization" or ownership of half the company via preferential issuance of shares in the local branches. These shares of course ended up in the hands of the Nigerian elite and the army officers more interested in dividends than in running businesses. True indigenous capitalism in the form of major black owned firms has had a hard time getting started in black Africa. The "market mammies" of Ghana and southwest Nigeria are an interesting partial exception.

The Education System was also externally controlled. It was organized to turn out the low level clerks and sometimes the technical assistants needed in all colonial areas. The French and British took the cream of the crop to their own universities to become ministers or priests, middle level administrators and perhaps doctors or lawyers. The lower levels were taught such germane subjects as British literature, history and geography along with English and mathematics. There was usually care taken to make the students tend the school crop gardens to make sure they did not forget how to be farmers. [The French went further than the British in inculcating their culture, emphasizing correct pronunciation and teaching students about "our ancestors the Gauls.]

Notice the lack of emphasis on business and skills like engineering. Partly this was due to the proclivities of the colonial administrators, partly to a feeling Africans were not suited to these areas, partly a desire not to create competition. There were some universities before independence. In West Africa, the British set up Fourah Bay College in Sierra Leone associated with (as was common) the University of London. The first Nigerian University, founded in 1948 at Ibadan, was also originally an external college of London. After independence, there was an attempt, strongly resisted by the British and by Nigerians educated by them to university level, to introduce technical education and the American land grant philosophy. Thus Ahmadu Bello University at Zaria in the north focused on technology with help from the University of Manchester and the University of Nigeria at Nsukka aided by Michigan State devoted a lot of attention to the social sciences and agriculture.

The Military have been a dominant factor in running Nigeria. This was not intended. The British left a force of about 8,000 on independence. Its Nigerian officers were largely from the Ibos from the southeast with an increasing number inducted from the north and to a lesser extent the southwest in the post independence years. The last British officers left a few years after independence. Northerners always made up the bulk of the troopers. There has always been controversy over the ethnic "balance" of the officer corps. This army ballooned to about 250,000 during the height of the civil war 1967-1970. It has been reduced as expeditiously as possible since to about 100,000 now. [Letting out men with military training into a society with few economic opportunities for them is considered a dangerous business in Africa.] At least up to the present regime, to its credit and perhaps with some thanks to British military tradition, the Nigerian armed forces have generally been reluctant rulers. They did freely turn over power once and say they are committed to doing so again in 1998. But whether they will stay out is an interesting question.

Armies have a peculiar status in many post-colonial societies. They are often made up of many of the ethnic groups in the country (although the proportions may be different) and perhaps apart from some universities there is opportunity for individuals from different groups to interact. By their nature, they deal with machinery, sometimes quite technically advanced. Officers and technicians too are exposed to world class standards, whether these are eastern or western. The services must be organized and disciplined to a much greater extent than civilian society. They are supposed to be national institutions. And training and education are a necessity not a luxury. The armed services in many ways seem better suited to running a country than the civilian elite. They have often acted on the belief that that is true, aided by the failures of the civilian political system.

Foreign policy of African countries has varied from pro-Western (Kenya) to very pro-Soviet (Guinea and Mozambique until the breakup of the Soviet empire). Its constant factor has been opposition to the white dominated regimes that remained in southern Africa. Now that South Africa has become a "normal" rather than a pariah state it will be interesting to see whether a single theme will emerge other than a general identification with "third world" issues. Possible new focusesare the New World Information Order (licensing journalists) and preferential treatment of trade and debt for poor countries are among these.

Nigeria's foreign policy outside Africa has been pro-Western and it has been a mainstay of many of the United Nations trucekeeping forces. It had a large contingent in the former Belgian Congo in the early 1960s for instance and Nigerians have served in the UN forces in Lebanon, Somalia and other areas. It was a vociferous supporter of liberation movements in southern Africa. The MPLA government of Angola, in particular, owes its legitimacy as much to Nigerian diplomacy as Soviet arms aid. A major theme has been to try to keep out foreign involvement in African political affairs, especially from the former Colonial powers. There has traditionally been great suspicion of French motives because of the numerous French interventions in the post-independence affairs of its former colonies. In trying to carry out this policy, Nigeria has not only joined but initiated pan-African attempts at resolving internal problems of other states. Notable among these interventions was its role in the Chadian African Intervention forces in the early 1980s (unsuccessful), its attempted mediation in border disputes between Mali and Bourkina Fasso (unsuccessful) and its current role as leader of the military forces of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) in Liberia. But because of its disproportionate population and, for Africa, wealth Nigeria has often been looked at suspiciously by its neighbors afraid it may use its muscle against their interests.

A final question, and not just for Nigeria is what sorts of people, with what sorts of training are needed to run a successful state. Most Nigerians hope, but do not necessarily expect, that part of the qualification should be that the rulers be civilians.

NIGERIA. "Nigeria's Rulers, ignoring court, decide to hold presidential vote," Kenneth B. Noble, NYT 12Jn93,p.4 talks of reaction to Justice Bassey Ikpeme's order to postpone the vote. Michael O'Brien, director of the USIA, being expelled for "blatant interference" in saying postponement would be unacceptable. Also credentials being withdrawn from 8 Americans here as election observers. Polls showed Moshood Abiola, Social Democratic Party, a Yoruba ahead with 47.3% of Bashir Tofa of the National Republican Party and a Kano man. Both are muslims and friends of current military president Ibrahim Babangida.

"Nigerian army sets aside election intended to restore democracy," Kenneth B. Noble, NYT 17Jn93, p.1 reports on legal challenge to suppress reporting results. Growing indications were that Moshood Abiola was having a decisive win. "Nigeria rights group cites opposition's gains," Kenneth B. Noble, NYT 19Jn93, p.2 reports on the release by the Campaign for Democracy of final results. Moshood Abiola was said to have won 19 of the 30 states. The story notes this is a setback for the Hausa-Fulani group of the north; both candidates are muslims but

"Nigeria reveals census' total, 88.5 million, and little more" NYT, 25 Mr 92, p.12. There is still considerable doubt about how many Nigerians there are. The 1952 British census was an undercount, the 1962 and the 1963 recounts were inflated and the 1973 census was annulled after it was taken -- possibly because it revealed facts about the country the rulers did not want to acknowledge. The December, 1991 census counted some 30 million less Nigerians than most thought existed. It seems to have been an honest attempt at a count, at least according to most official observers.

"Nigeria had to act against coup plotters," NYT, 2 Se 95, 18 is a letter from the Nigerian Ambassador to the US, Zubair M. Kazaure, justifying detention and death sentences for those suspected in a recent coup plot. He also justifies other aspects of domestic policies including Abacha's 1993 takeover and the regime's economic and political actions. Interesting alternate views are presented in Bob Herbert's column in the Times of August 14 titled "The Fantasy Coup," which generated this letter from Ambassador Kazaure. Letters from Nigerian exiles in the US have often had uncomplimentary things to say about his character and veracity.

"Repression in Nigeria," Howard W. French reporting from Abidjan, Ivory Coast in the NYT, 12 No 95, 18 says that going ahead with execution of eight ethnic activists, the country's leader, General Sani Abacha, was betting that international isolation was "less terrifying than the perils of Nigeria's internal politics."

"Commonwealth suspends Nigeria over executions," Reuters to NYT, 12 No 95, 18 reports on the action of the 52 member Commonwealth. It is unprecedented. Only Gambia, currently under military rule, dissented. President Nelson Mandela of South Africa has been a driving force behind strong actions against the Nigerian regime.

"Nigerian government hangs 9 activists," CDT(AP), Frank Aigbogun, 13 No 95, 10 reports that the eight final words of Ken Saro-Wiwa before his body went limp were "Lord take my soul, but the struggle continues." It also reports that because of faulty equipment it took five attempts to hang the anti-government activist. Eight countries, including the United States, withdrew their ambassadors from Nigeria in protest. Ken was perhaps the most prominent Ogboni activist -- the group inhabits the main oil-producing area of the country and has been complaining of not receiving enough compensation for the environmental damage done to their environment and livelihood by the oil industry. The major company involved, Shell has come under attack for not pressing the government to commute the sentences and for appearing to support it by going ahead with a $4 billion natural gas liquefaction program. Shell says it has no influence on the government and says if it didn't cooperate with the government some other oil or gas firm would.

"Nigeria Foaming," The Economist, 18 No 95, 15-16 raises the question of whether the execution of 9 political activists protesting injustices to the Ogoni people will be forgotten soon by outsiders -- eager to make money from Nigerian oil and gas. Oil revenues are systematically stolen and squandered says the article and even though Nigeria is not the most brutal country in the world, it is the most misruled.

"After the hangings," The Economist, 18 No 95, 18 notes the executions were announced while Nigerians were glued to the Nigeria-Uzbekistan soccer match. National news at 9pm ignored them as did state-controlled radio.

"Nigeria sees its sinking fortune in a soccer group's snub", Howard W. French, NYT, 6 Ap 95, A5 talks about the recent cancellation of the FIFA world junior championship to have been held here. Given the soccer madness that infects Nigeria, this snub may have hurt more than most. The argument was that security was not sufficient. "But perhaps more than security, soccer officials were also concerned about what has made life intolerable for many Nigerians: a level of corruption so high and an absence of basic public services so complete that many have concluded that the only service the military Government provides is to rob its own people...As with other tax money that frequently finds its way into the pockets of officials here, little of the budget allocated to get ready for the soccer tournament seemed to have been spent for its intended purpose....said one professor who spoke in his shabby offices where he rarely ventures [] because his salary arrives months behind schedule. 'The sad fact is that without organizations like FIFA to bear down on us in all facets of life, this country, the way it is going, will never work."

A region where physical circumstances attracted northern European settlers just before Europe embarked on its modernization, and where those settlers remained for three centuries, a fossil of medieval European attitudes preserved in happy isolation from the rest of the world. And where those settlers, after confronting and subjugating a variety of "native" African groups, found themselves repeatedly challenged by "new Europeans" who came to southern Africa for a variety of motives, nearly all of which collided violently with the ancient rural value system of the older settlers. And where, because incredible mineral riches, and "strategic location" made the region impossible for the world to ignore, this southern Eden seemed inevitably destined to be the stage for a major tragedy. Whether that will happen is even now unfolding. As in many countries, decisions and events elsewhere will have as much to do with the outcome as those made inside South Africa.

A paradoxical sub-theme: That South Africa, so wildly atypical of sub-Saharan Africa today, is, in some ways, quintessentially African, especially in its physical geography.

Roots of South Africa's isolation from the rest of the world: the basis of contemporary tragedy.

Sheer distance from anywhere else. Peninsular location. The analogue between South Africa, western Europe, southeast Asia, and southern India. Ethnic analogues. Southern Africa as refuge area for "primitive" africans: Hottentots and Bushmen-- or Khoisan to use an academically respectable term.

South Africa's formidable physical geography, as seen by outsiders: The smooth straight coast (and the extraordinary importance of those rare places where good harbors were found).

On the grand pattern of climates in general, and southern Africa in particular. Analogues.

Rain in southern Africa: where it falls, when it falls, and where it comes from. Roles of the ITC, the Polar Front. Analogues in the northern hemisphere.

Ocean currents in the southern (and northern) hemispheres,, and why they matter. Analogues to the Benguela and Brazil Currents, and those in the northern hemisphere. Effect of cold currents on rainfall patterns onshore. The resulting rainfall patterns in Cape Colony, the Caroo, Southwest Africa (Namibia), and Natal. Analogues in the United States.

Why the climate of extreme southern Africa is different than areas to the north, and why it made a difference--and still makes a difference. The basic difference between the southwestern tip of Africa, and the southeastern tip of Africa: Cape Colony vs. Natal.

The historic roots of European settlement in southern Africa, and why it is not so reasonable to talk about European "imperialism" in South Africa.

What was going on in Europe during the 17th Century. The 30 Years War and its violent consequences. Shifts in power among European states. Roots of the commercial revolution, and the rise of the Dutch Republic. Dutch commercial ambitions, and the extraordinary contrast between them and the ambitions of the Iberian states: Spain and Portugal. How those ambitions affected the way South Africa was settled.

The special nature of the Dutch (Boer) colonists; Mid-17th Century Calvinism, and its attitudes toward race, and toward the land.

The geographical-historical roots of contemporary tragedy in southern Africa. The sequence of events.

-- The special physical environment, and how it simultaneously confined and nourished Dutch settlement

Increasing isolation of southern Africa from the mainstream of European affairs.

The growing conservatism of Boer Calvinism, especially when compared with European religious and social attitudes. Agriculture as a basis of Boer life, and its consequences. (Boer = peasant/farmer in Dutch)

Demographic changes. Explosion of Boer population, and the reasons for it. (Biblical sanctions, again). What happened to the natives.

(2) Arrival of the British, and why they caused trouble. British rule as part of the post-Napoleonic redistribution of colonies throughout the world. How the British and Boers clashed. Abolition of slavery in the British empire (1833). The Great Trek: getting away from the British and a turning point in Boer history: 1835-36.

(3) The new geography of South Africa resulting from the Trek. What the Boers found in the interior.

-- Physical geography: Veld and Limpopo. Why the Boers took kindly to the Veld, and why they stopped at the edge of the Limpopo...tsetse fly infection

-- Human geography: the Tswana, Xhosa and Zulu, and how they differed from earlier natives that the Boers had encountered. Culture shock, and military shock. Bantu uprisings: 1850 and 1878.

(4) Mineral discoveries and the great collision between Boers and British. The facts. Diamonds at Kimberley, 1867. Gold at the Witwatersrand, 1886. Clash of Boer rural values and the "modern views" of the British. the special quality of British "settlers." The classic confrontation of rural and urban world-views. Political clashes: the First Boer War, 1881. The Second Boer War (1899-1902). Formation of the Union of South Africa (1910), and how it reflected the new relationship between British and Boers, who lost the war and won the peace. The subordinate status of the blacks.

(5) Economic and geographic consequences: what the gold mines needed. The dilemma of cheap labor and how it was solved. The Native Land Act. How the act worked too well and led to competition between blacks and "poor whites" in the work force. The solutions:

-- job reservation, state corporations and influx controls. Indian immigration to Natal. The four "racial" groups.

(6) The rise of Afrikaner nationalism. The National Party, the 1948 election and the advent of formal apartheid. Early version: Group Areas, Race Classification, education. Verwoerd and separate development. The philosophy and the practice. Petty and grand apartheid. Leaving the Commonwealth in 1962.

(7) The geography of apartheid. "Homelands" and where they were located. Resettlement, shanty towns and commuter settlements -- the fragmented city. Population explosion.

Changes -- removal of petty apartheid, abolition of passes, educational change. Later changes in grand apartheid. Reasons: internal and international pressures, economic needs. Internal opposition from blacks starts officially with the founding of the African National Congress in 1910. Early indifference to ANC; Sharpeville (1960) massacre and banning of ANC.

Response -- opposition from external "bases." The Soweto Uprising (1976) and growth of opposition groups: trade unions, the UDF. The crackdown of 1985-9, the state of emergency, detentions and press restrictions. White opposition fitful and on the fringes until 1980s. Involvement of Afrikaners.

International pressures -- "a crime against humanity" (UN), a "heresy" (WCC). Early embargoes and sanctions. The 1980s: divestment, disinvestment and sanctions. The 1990s: South Africa no longer a pariah but are there funds available from outside to help peaceful change and obtain economic justice for the majority? Critical nature of 1992 -- constitutional changes, and the 1995 local elections. What will happen after "power-sharing" goes and Nelson Mandela dies?

(9) Apartheid's second front: Southern Africa. The neighbors. The "white" buffer and its removal with Portuguese withdrawal (1975) and independence of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe (1981). The last colony, Namibia gone in 1990. South Africa's economic and transportation links with neighbors and why they were and are promoted by South Africa. Geography of rail routes.

Destabilization and its rationale. The enormous costs -- Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe, Zambia. The SADCC as an African response.

(10) Angolan "settlement" -- the end of the beginning or the beginning of the end. Democratization.

Journals have more recent information but to get a perspective on southern Africa, good books are;

A handy source of facts and statistics by a reporter who wrote for a South African newspaper.

Hanlon, Joseph, 1986. Apartheid's Second Front: South Africa's War Against its Neighbors. London: Penguin.

News items and miscellanea:"Africa's economies: Reforms pay off," NYT 13Mr94 P18, Thomas L. Friedman discusses world bank classification of African nations' GDP change based on how well or poorly they did in macroeconomic policy. Those who reformed generally did better. Looked at 29 sub=Saharan economies in two periods 1981-86 = economic crisis and 1987-1991 when all introduced economic reforms. Those who'd done the tough work earlier did better.

"Winnie Mandela builds a base rooted in despair," NYT 28Ja93, p.a3 talks about the attempts of the estranged wife of ANC leader Nelson Mandela to build a political base among young radicals and poor people in the black townships. She is currently out on $70 bail after being convicted in 1991 of kidnappings carried out by her bodyguards. There is resentment about black leaders who have moved themselves and their families to wealthy white suburbs. She has : said power sharing is a bargain between "the elite of the oppressed and the oppressors"; attacked "the notion that suffering at the hands of the enemy automatically qualified a person to be a leader," but responded to queries as to whether she wanted to establish a new power base by saying "I am not about to abandon the ANC to the mercies of elitist politicians. If I have support I will locate that support within the ANC."

"South Africa says it built 6 atom bombs," Bill Keller NYT 25Mr93 p.1 talks of the 15 year program, dismantled in 1989. President deKlerk said the program was not helped by other countries (Israel was rumored to be cooperating). The article also says S.Africa has cancelled plans to build a new long-range solid fueled rocket.

"South Africa's wealth is luring black talent," Bill Keller NYT 12Fe93, p.1 talks of the stream of technical talent from black Africa coming south.

"South African rightists rally behind ex-generals," Bill Keller, NYT 6My93, p3 notes Constand Viljoen, chief (1980-1985) of the SADF while it was involved in destabilizing its neighbors and the fight in Angola has joined the resistance front. White resistance groups are said to be thrilled. There's talk of regional autonomy/separation - somewhat agreeable to the ANC.

"A nice place, parliament, but hark, the bells toll," Bill Keller, NYT 8Fe93, p.4 talks of reaction to the potential demise of the current 3-house legislature.

"Pretoria seeks guarantee of rights it long denied," Bill Keller NYT 3Fe93, p.3 talks of efforts to put a bill of rights into a new constitution.

"White South African party seeks black maids' votes," Bill Keller NYT 28Fe93 p.3 discusses the efforts of the Democratic Party to enroll black household workers. One talked about making it on $115 a month, another $100 a month for 13 hour days of cooking and cleaning.

"Zulus train for battle South Africa fears," NYT, 2 Ap 94, 4 discusses the power struggle between the ruling African National Congress and the Inkatha Freedom Party (possibly more a personal faction devoted to Mangosuthu Buthelezi, a member of the Zulu royal family). That continues to this day (1996) with scarcely a month going by without small massacres of supporters of one group by adherents of the other.

"Too gentle giant," The Economist, 18 No 95, 41-42 reveals the importance now being placed (forced) on South Africa as a civilizing force for the continent. This is largely due to the moral authority of Nelson Mandela. He has said South Africa has enough problems of its own to deal with and has been reluctant to openly intervene in problems in other African countries. The major exception has been Nigeria where Mandela has been a leader in criticism of the current military regime, a force in suspending Nigeria's commonwealth membership. But he has also, as is his nature, left the door open to accomodation.

"South Africa's civil war," The Economist, 6 Ja 96, 31-32 talks about the internecine killings in Natal province among supporters of the ANC (African National Congress) and the (Zulu leadership's) Inkatha Freedom Party.

Etymological origin: Phoenician ACU (ashu?)--Glorious. Probably relating to sunrise.

If the nineteenth was the British century, the twentieth the American, then it may be suggested that the twenty-first will be the Asian century. It already has the most dynamic economies and the two potential powerhouses, India and China, will remain the two countries with the largest populations although their ranks will reverse. (Most have not included the former Soviet Asiatic land mass in discussions of Asia although the newly independent Central Asian states now qualify. The rest is still run by Russians and thus European, or as some Russians like to say, Eurasian). How did these developments occur? Remember, except for Japan and Thailand, the continent was under formal or de facto control of outsiders through half this century and had been for periods of up to several hundred years. We will be examining two very different countries that exemplify the diversity of Asian experiences, Japan and Sri Lanka, but first some basic background.

From southwest Asia in a long arc to Japan, the continent spans some 7,000 miles and stretches some 4500 miles north to south. It covers the low to middle latitudes, mostly in the northern hemisphere. There are two Asias climatically, wet (green) and dry(brown). The major distinctive weather pattern is the monsoon and its failure or excess still affect the very lives of tens of millions in south and east Asia. There is in fact a hypothesis that the weather pattern over Tibet may tie in with the western Pacific oscillations and affect weather throughout the northern hemisphere and perhaps the world.

Looking at a map, the first thing that should strike you is the "peninsularity" of the continent -- second only to Europe. A closer look at the details reveals the "chopped up" nature of the land with a "knot" in the Pamirs, a generally high east to west trending mountain spine, and "fingers" pointed towards the seas. This has major effects on overland travel, especially in the pre-modern transport era. Asia is the highest elevation continent averaging 3,000 feet (North America - 2000, Africa - 1900, South America - 1800, and Europe - 1000). The human results of the physiography and the climate variation include the very uneven population density ranging from that of Tibet and the desert areas to the thousand or more per square kilometer in riverine India, coastal China and Japan and Java. The physical environment also encouraged development of quite different cultures, isolated from each other until recently. There are always exceptions to such generalizations and sea trade, the spread of such religions as Islam and Buddhism and the near ubiquity of rice culture are examples here.

If we "stretch" things a bit to cover Egypt's Nile Valley, Asia is the site of the world's first civilizations: the Nile, the Tigris-Euphrates, northwest India, northern China. Can you speculate on why? All the world's major religions started in Asia as did mathematics, astronomy, architecture and medicine. The common domestic animals -- dog, cat, cow, horse, sheep and pig -- were also Asian originated. Apart from the eastern Mediterranean littoral which had intimate ties with Asia at many points over time, there was long running but tenuous contact with Europe via central Asia (the Silk Road) and later via the Arabs trading by land and sea. These Euro-Asian contacts were most extensive in the "Middle East" -- Persian empires' expeditions towards the west, the Trojan war, and Alexander's expeditions to the east being perhaps the most famous in antiquity. The luxury trade in such things as silk and spices whetted European appetites for closer contact with these cornucopia without the expensive intervention of middlemen like the Turks, Arabs, Persians and Venetians. The strength of Islam, especially under the Turks made direct trade eastward difficult. So new routes to the orient were needed.

Development of maritime inventions (new sailing technology, navigation) in Portugal which later spread to other European countries made this possible. The lure of Asia played a critical role in these developments and their diffusion. First the Portuguese, then the Spanish, Dutch, English and French raced to find new routes to Asia and open trade. The earliest of these modern pathways to eventuate was the route around the Cape of Good Hope (why does this make geographic sense? look at a map from a historical atlas--pre Suez Canal), later joined by the trans-isthmian land route across Panama and the dangerous journey around Cape Horn as well as the land route through Egypt to the Red Sea. Centuries were spent looking for the almost mythic "Northwest Passage" to Asia, exemplified by the expeditions of Hudson (as in river and bay). The current undersea route developed for nuclear submarine use has also been proposed for trade purposes. There was also long lesser-known interest in a northeast sea route to Asia around northern Russia. Vitus Bering, of Bering Straits fame, was one of the (Danish) navigators hired by the Czars to explore for such a passage. The Suez (1869) and later the Panama (1914) canal were long time dreams, realized as soon as technology could cope.

Early European footholds were established in Ceylon (Sri Lanka), the Spice Islands (Indonesia), and in India (Goa - Portugal, Pondichery - France, Madras - England) and through restricted trading posts in China and Japan. The European drive for control rather than trade crested in the eighteenth and again in the nineteenth centuries. The English defeated the French in India in 1763 and succeeded in opening up China with the help of the opium trade in the 1840s. The Dutch took and held on to what is now Indonesia, the Portuguese kept snippets like Macau and E. Timor, the Spanish established a firm grip on the Philippines, and the French succeeded late in Indo-China. Later, the Germans picked up Pacific islands and part of New Guinea and the Japanese entered the colonial game with their win over China in 1895. By the turn of the twentieth century the vast bulk of China was, while nominally independent, a set of de facto colonies of various powers including the Japanese, Germans and Russians as well as the British and French. Even the "non-colonialist" United States picked up islands like the Hawaiian chain and the Philippines as well as trade privileges in China. Riots and mutinies were not uncommon but the Europeans kept control. Southwest Asia was tied up by treaty and protectorate agreements. Only Thailand and Japan were to remain independent (glance at maps to see if you can figure out why). The Russians reached the Pacific in the 1600s and kept pushing south and north from the early trails. They succeeded in the nineteenth century in taking parts of central Asia (consolidated as late as the 1920s) and "adjusted" their border with China to their liking. It has only recently been "confirmed" in talks freely entered into by both Russia and China. By the end of the nineteenth century, Japan became the first Asian country to establish modern colonies with the successful outcome of the Sino-Japanese war and the acquisition of the Ryukyus and Formosa (Taiwan).

The two world wars of this century were critical in setting the stage for present conditions. The first saw the Japanese emerge as a major recognized power and take over former German island territories and their concession in the Shandong peninsula, a precursor to later developments in Manchuria and China and the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Scheme." The second world war saw the first defeats of western colonialism and the revolutionary success of the Japanese contributed to the upsurge of independence movements and the successful overthrow of former colonial masters. Although there were peaceful turnovers, mostly by the British, in places such as India like the many in Africa (Portuguese territories and Southern Africa aside), most of Asia "earned" its independence. Perhaps that is one reason why some Asian countries are very sensitive to what their leaders see as attempts by Westerners to impose our standards on them in areas such as free speech and human rights. [Many Asian human rights campaigners say this is self-serving nonsense on the part of autocrats and thugs.]

"A tale of red guards and cannibals," NYT, 6Ja93, p.a8. Copies of official government documents, smuggled out of China by a dissident, from the late sixties in Guanxi province in southwest China seem to offer a meticulous record of how Red Guards and Communist officials in one province not only tortured their victims to death but also ate their flesh. At some high schools, students killed their principals and then cooked and ate the bodies to celebrate a triumph over "counterrevolutionaries," the documents say. Government cafeterias are supposed to have had bodies hung on meathooks and served human flesh to workers.

"Rally for Rama," The Economist, 13Ap91, p.36. Talks of the Bharatiya Janata party in India which is trying to build up a sense of Hindu power to win control of government. Notes support by 6000 holy men. Discusses the struggle over the mosque at Ayodhya whose destruction in late 1992 caused riots and deaths in Pakistan, India and Bangladesh.

"Worthwhile Canadian Initiative," The Economist, 13Ap91 p.35 is a brief description of Canadian attempts to set up a North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue to foster talking in an area where some of the world's biggest armies and navies coexist uneasily.

"The future written in a grain of rice," The Economist, 9Mr91, p.83. Rice provides the main calory source for 2.7 billion people in Asia. Mythically, the Japanese emperor is the living embodiment of the God of the ripened rice plant, Lord Vishnu created rice, and God Indra taught humankind how to grow it. The article talks of the problems in keeping rice production growing in light of some severe environmental and other problems.

"Asian adventures," The Economist, 30My92, p.17-18. Theme is that selling in Asian markets is difficult but worth the effort. About 55 percent of world population. Double the economic growth rate in the advanced countries. China and India with 2 billion people have potential growth rates of 10 percent a year. Asia buys half the world's semiconductors, 40 percent of the world's televisions. Challenge is dealing with vast and diverse area; three or four main cultures and several smaller ones. Business based more on personal contacts and trust than in the west. Remember what happened to those in the American auto business who thought in the 1960s that there was no reason to fear Japanese competition.

"China's silent upheaval," NYT, 30Mr92, p.a17. William Safire's column notes among other items remarks of China-watchers on its cultural/political geography: rigid north and freewheeling south; the inward looking "Yellow River" mindset of the interior and the "blue-water" mindset of Shanghai and Canton. I would extend this to include all coastal provinces from Shandong south.

"For India, will it be social change, secularism or a Hindu right wing," NYT, 2Ap91, p.a1 and a8. The title tells the story, but included is a neat map of the political landscape, description of the political parties and a concise description of critical issues. An excellent introduction to India now.

"The silk road catches fire," The Economist, 26De92, p,44-46. "With the endong of the cold war, the playground of Kipling's 'Great Game" is no longer out of bounds. But only true enthusiasts need apply." [See Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia. New York: Kodansha International, 1992.] Talks about human, physical, political geography of the former Soviet Central Asian republics and their current problems.

"Fortress Asia?," The Economist, 24Oc92, pp. 35-36. Discusses progess of talks about a southeast Asian free trade area, an idea raised by Malaysia some years ago as fears of trade restrictions by America and Europe became intense.

"The titan stirs," The Economist, 28No92, 18pp., special survey. "If China's economy grows as fast for the next 20 years as it has for the past 14, it will be the biggest economy on earth."

"China building its muscle, making some nervous," NYT 11Ja93, pp. 1 and a8. A diplomat: "Trying to become a superpower would be completely opposite to the tradition of the Chinese, because they never went outward on a grand scale." New military buildup, purchase of Su27s and possible aircraft carrier from Russia, upgrading of Chinese built naval vessels etc., claim over entire South China Sea, dispute over Senkaku/Diaoyu islands northeast of Taiwan, possibility of bases and listening posts being set up off Burma in exchange for aid to its military. A centerpiece of the article is a map showing China's view of its sphere of influence in the late 19th and early 20th century, based on a map published in 1954 and republished in John W. Garver, Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China, Prentice-Hall, 1992. It includes Nepal, half of Bangladesh, Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, Indochina, Taiwan and north and south Korea.

"Afghanistan, always riven, is breaking into ethnic parts," NYT 17JA93, p.1 and 8 discusses the prospects that the country, two years after Russian troops withdrew and a year after the "freedom fighters" triumphed over the Soviet supported government, will split into three parts. Each would have a reasonable amount of ethnic, linguistic and religious unity. In the south and east the Pathans would dominate, in the southwest the people have longstanding ties with Persia/Iran and are Shiites as opposed to the predominant Sunni Moslems in the rest of the country, and in the north Tajiks and Uzbeks predominate. What is left out of this article is the likelihood that if this breakdown occurs, the pieces will either be absorbed by the neighboring states or will cause them to break down in turn.

"Clan feuds, an old problem, are still threatening Chinese," NYT 17Ja93, p10. Outsiders think of the Chinese as monolithic. But loyalties of most people start with the extended family, then the "clan" of the same surname, then the local area. And there are strong regional feelings and rivalries. This article reports on the fact that huge battles between rival clans have returned to China since old traditions have been allowed to re-emerge.

"Chinese bet their shirts on buttons and, Bingo!," NYT 18Ja93, p.4 discusses Qiaotou, Zhejiang province which by producing over 12 billion buttons a year in private factories is the button capital of the world.

"Southeast Asian economies" Economist 20Mr93, p24 talks of General Chatichai (Thailand) and his idea of suwannaphume, cooperation and development in SE Asia. Not all is rosy. Vietnam has an official goal of doubling the economy by 2000. That's impossible. It, per Nguyen Xuan Oanh an economist once prime minister of South Vietnam, would need 10 years and $2.8 billion a year to reach economic takeoff. With the US still witholding aid and discouraging others from investing, difficult! Also, much of the business in Myanmar and Indochina is environmental "pillage." Thai generals are hand in glove with Khmer Rouge and the thugs running Burma exporting gems and raw logs. But, the article says, the dream is worthwhile: "economic development is never to be rejected because it makes some people or class much richer than others"; and development may help defuse ancient tensions and modern ones too such as the impasse over the Spratly islands in the South China Sea.

"India: bombed but unbroken," Economist 20Mr93, p.39 discusses the recent bombings in Calcutta and Bombay using sophisticated bombs with Semtex and RDX. The government theory is that the bombers want to frighten away foreign investors -- targets included airlines, the stock exchange and hotels where businessmen stay. A second hypothesis is that the bombings were a revenge for any of several Indian actions: the Ayodhya mosque demolition and subsequent Hindu-Moslem riots, Sikhs answering the police killing of Gurbachan Singh Manochal, one of their heroes, or Tamil Tigers angry at the suicide of their second in command upon capture by Indian forces.

"Australia: all sax, no sound," Economist 20Mr93, p.40 talks of the surprising win by the Labor Party despite 11 percent unemployment and deep foreign debt. The opposition candidate's financial/taxation policies were not understood or appreciated by the public.

"The writer's heart belongs to India, and it bleeds," Edward Gargan, NYT 29Mr93, a6 discusses Khushwant Singh talking about the problems in keeping the dream of a secular India. "It is the genuinely secular Hindu against the Hindu." He has been assigned guards since 1985 when he opposed demands for an independent Sikh homeland (Khalistan). His essay "Why I am an Indian" is well known -- "Why am I an Indian? I did not have any choice: I was born one. If the good Lord hadd consulted me on the subject I might ave chosen a country more affluent, less crowded, less censorious in amtters of food and drink, unconcerned with personal equations and free of religious bigotry...My head tells me it is better to live abroad but my heart tells me 'get back to India' ."

"Despite U.S., Yeltsin backs rocket deal with India," Sanjoy Hazarika, NYT 30Ja93, p.2 told of his backing of continued sales of rocket engines for the Indian space program. He also said his country was "moving from a pro-Western emphasis," and considered itself a "Euro-Asian power." The engines are cryogenic (LH,LOx) and the US has objected because they have military implications, especially in conjunction with India's possession of nuclear weapons. It feels the sales violate the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime which the space powers agreed to.

"Chinese puzzles: developing countries are less poor than official figures suggest," Economist 15My93, p83 describes a recent IMF (International Monetary Fund) exercise in revaluing GDP (Gross Domestic Product) estimates. Rather than using current foreign exchange values, they worked up a set of Purchasing Power Parities (PPP). These take price differences into account; for instance it is less expensive to have laundry done in China or to take public transportation than it is in the US. When one does this, developing countries' share of world output jumps from 18 to 34 percent. The article notes one of the best reasons for thinking this is the best way to handle such international comparisons is the case of Asia. Even though this is the fastest growing region by far, its share of world output between 1985-1990 fell from 7.9 to 7.2 percent because of falls in exchange rates against the dollar.

"That's Japan, by jingo," Economist 27Mr93, p36 talks of the Supreme Court's ruling that textbook screening does not conflict with academic freedom. The case was in regard to an historian, Saburo Ienaga, who took the government to court in 1965 (!) for not allowing his books in schools. He has said that Japan's military regime in the 1930s and 1940s glamorized war and covered up atrocities. The court also gave an Okinawa man a one year suspended sentence for burning the flag, noting it was damage to public property. The education ministry has taken heart from such cases and encouraged schools to show the flag and have students learn the national anthem. [This section on Japan is included to give an indication of the reasons why Japan's neighbors in Asia are still uneasy about its intentions.]

"Kim rides the dragon," Economist 27Mr93, pp35-36 discusses President Kim Young Sam's quote "I believe it is my historic mission to revive the economy. Our economy is in a very difficult situation. The time has come for sweat and tears." Growth has been slowing for 3 years and the World Bank has projected Korea as falling behind the other "little dragons." [Kim took office 25 February; he joined the governing party after years of being a dissident and his "gamble" paid off.]

"Hindus now demanding the leadership of India," Edward Gargan, NYT 24Ja93, p.3 talks of the challenge to secularism and tolerance (in India's constitution) by some Hindus. The main nationalist party, the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) advocates moving quickly to build nuclear weapons, ban a lot of foreign investment, promote a sense of Hindu accomplishments in religion, education, and culture. Its point is that the 726 million Hindus make up 83 percent of the population and should run the country. As an example of their policies, the case of Uttar Pradesh state is cited: there, primary and secondary curricula have emphasized Hindu accomplishments, English is discouraged, and conventional mathematics has been replaced by what is called Vedic math; Indian history conforms more to Hindu myth than normally accepted accounts. There is a genetic/eugenic component to BJP concerns, too. First is a worry about Moslems having higher birth rates than Hindus. Second is the feeling that the wrong (better class) Hindus are practising birth control while the poorer ones aren't.

"Indian police seize tens of thousands to block protest," Edward A. Gargan, NYT 25Fe93, p.1 notes more than 45,000 Hindus were arrested across India as they attempted to travel to the capital to join a big protest to force the government to resign. The Hindu nationalist party, the BJP, claims the government has suppressed the majority in favor of the 110 million Muslims.

"The Hindu Upsurge: The road to Ayodhya," Economist 6Fe93 pp21-23. Tries to make the point that the upsurge of Hindu militantism is but a symptom of a deeper malaise: the decay of the Indian state. Some quotes: (22)"the steady deterioration of political morality and governance since independence"; "In 1947 Congress was a party of national ideals...Nehru could and did, with impunity assault traditional Hindu practices. He brought in the concept of equality regardless of race, religion, caste or sex. Hindu personal law which denied women property rights, sanctioned dowry, permitted multiple marriages for men and forbade widow remarriage was scrapped. Muslim personal law was left alone, a sore point with the BJP." "Third factor ...steady grassroots work done to organize Hindus since 1925 by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sang...It disliked Gandhi's nonviolence, which it saw as an alien, Christian, concept." The problem is not a Hindu-Moslem one. It is a dispute between secular and communal Hindus over treatment of Moslems.

"China's newest partner: South Korea," Nicholas D. Kristof, NYT 5Ap93, D1. Talks of Korean ties with Shangdong province and its 42 million as paralleling Hong Kong and Guangdong and Taiwan with Fujian.

"Muslim militants share Afghan link," NYT 28Mr93, p14 The Afghan war of resistance was a training ground for Muslim militants throughout South Asia and the Middle East. Tie-in with World Trade Center bombing is one example; fundamentalists in Algeria and Egypt others.

"Son of North Korean leader may be succeeding to power," David E. Sanger, NYT 25Mr93, A10 talks about Kim Jong Il, the 51 year old "Dear Leader" and possibility he is the lead force behind the current nuclear confrontation.

"In northeast India, changes come swiftly and violently," Sanjoy Hazarika, NYT, 20 Au 95, A10 talks about the influence of newly available Western television and improvements in access by land and air. Five major rebel groups are fighting to maintain what they regard as their culture (more like Southeast than South Asian) and religion (Christian) against a flood of migrants from Bangladesh and lowland India. A quote from the article gives a flavor of the place. "The northeast has always been a bit of the wild west," said a former Indian Army general who was based in the area for several years, "Parts of it have been out of control where politicians and bureaucrats are hand in glove with militants, drugs and money."

"Vietnam: Oh, Ho," The Economist, 8 Ja 94, 38 "Achieve Uncle Ho's ideology: solidarity, solidarity, greater solidarity," says the draft prepared for the mid-term congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party. The full congress is due in 1996 and no one agrees what will be said. Economic reforms are still resisted by some members, blaming them for social problems like corruption.

"An ex-minister atones to return to Sikh fold," John Burns, NYT, 2 Ap 94, 4 talks about the penance being done by Buta Singh, an ex minister of Indira Gandhi's government to atone for the government's 1984 attack on the Sikh's holy temple at Amritsar. The Punjab seems to be settling down; 73 killings in 1993 - down from 1770 in 1992. Reports indicate an upsurge of prosperity with the decline in violence.

"Burmese cry intrusion (They lack a great wall)," Philip Shenon, NYT, 29 Mr 94, A4 talks about growing Chinese influence as supplier to the military and Burma's largest trade partner. Burmese are growing uncertain as to whether this is a good thing, but the country's continuing isolation due to its military leaders' policies make it unlikely that it will change.

"Burmese general bars talks soon with arrested democracy leader," Philip Shenon, NYT, 8 Mr 94, A8 reports the head of Burmese military intelligence, Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt ruled out early talks with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, under house arrest despite her party's winning 80% of the last vote and receiving a Nobel Peace Prize.

"AIDS onslaught breaches the Burmese citadel," Philip Shenon, NYT, 11 Mr 94, 4 talks of the late and reluctant admission by Burma that it has fallen victim to the same epidemic as its southeast Asian neighbors. The problems here are familiar: a growth in prostitution supposedly via migrants, a large population of intravenous drug users, shortage of condoms and a social system that makes AIDS education difficult. Estimates of HIV positive people run from 150-450,000 out of a population of 43 million and the infection rate among intravenous drug users in surveys runs 80%, the highest in the world.

"How and why to survive Chinese tax torture," The Economist, 2 De 95, 63-64 says "Many Chinese officials still think that exploiting foreigners is patriotic. Even so, the country's market is becoming much like any other, only bigger." Big gains may lie ahead for those who stay the course but in the immediate future, taxes on foreign businesses will increase.

"India in a hurry," The Economist, 5 Mr 94, 17 talks about a speedup of economic growth and foreign investment in India. GDP growth since 1991 has been 3.1% compared with China's 10.9% and the $900 million in direct foreign investment compares poorly with the $15 billion going to China. Still, this was much better than performance earlier.

1. Sinhalese are seen as superior to other ethnic groups, because they were the original inhabitants of the island and because (according to the myth) they were 'Aryan' migrants from Bengal.

2. Sri Lanka is seen as an isolated island, i.e. the Sinhalese feel that they are a minority in the region with no other country except Sri Lanka. The minority groups have ethnic links with other countries (e.g. Tamil Nadu in India).

3. The Sinhalese see themselves as the protectors of Buddhism. Appeals to save Buddhism from non-Buddhists and calls for a 'dharma yudhaya' (holy war) to protect Buddhist monuments and religion have been made.

Hence, Sinhalese Buddhist ideology sees Sri Lanka as the land of Sinhalese Buddhists who are the true 'bhumi putra' (sons of the soil). All other groups are aliens who are out to exploit the country and its people for their own gain, in the process disgracing the 'purity' and 'integrity' of the Sinhalese Buddhist people. This charge is now laid mainly against Tamils.

1. Foreign or minority-owned businesses are said to have retarded the development of Sinhalese businesses. Calls are therefore made for privileges for Sinhalese merchants and for measures against 'alien traders'.

2. Another common view is that non-Sinhalese have an unfair share of government jobs and university places.

The Tamil Consciousness has evolved as a mirror-image to the Sinhalese consciousness. This has also resulted in Tamil chauvinism against Sinhalese and Muslims.

The ethnic conflicts are mainly about economic opportunities and power for different groups/classes of people. These groups/classes are not defined by ethnicity.

Political administration dominated by a westernized elite (upper-class, english-speaking, well-educated). A fair share of Tamils, due to educational opportunities (missionary schools in Jaffna). Beginning antagonism between Sinhalese and Tamils caused by British 'divide and rule' policies in the 1920s.

Sinhalese populist/nationalist 'revolution' against westernized elite. After the election in 1956 the Sri Lankan State evolved as a Sinhalese State.

Political administration increasingly dominated by middle-class Sinhalese. This group has made decisions on official language, admission to universities and on recruitment to administrative services favoring the Sinhalese.

State-regulated economy (expanding public sector within a context of a closed import-substitution strategy, limited private sector). State patronage became very important.

- created extensive job opportunities mainly for the Sinhalese people, through the expansion of the public sector.

Consequently, the Sinhalese urban middle- and upper-classes had good opportunities for upward social mobility. The urban lower-classes were covered by extensive welfare schemes. The Tamils were increasingly alienated, and calls for a Tamil Eelam (Homeland) started to appear in the 1970s. The Tamils that entered into business ventures had to do so through private sector trading, transport and service. The ethnic tension increased but did not erupt into widespread rioting.

i) Increasing trade deficit due to lowered prices on tea, rubber and coconut in the world market.

ii) The state-regulated economy was unable to create economic growth, employment and eradicate poverty.

Consequently, shift to a policy of an open market economy and reduced welfare transfers.

Sinhalese entrepreneurs, without state patronage, found themselves in direct competition with foreign businesses as well as with Tamil and Muslim entrepreneurs. Many Sinhalese small-scale industries disappeared. The urban poor lost their welfare support. On the other hand, increased trade and expansion of the private sector created better opportunities for the minority ethnic groups (Tamil businessmen dominated trade).

This resulted in frequent, widespread and very violent ethnic riots between 1977 and 1983. Organized mobs of dissatisfied Sinhalese (backed by the Government) attacked Tamils in 1983. This further alienated the young middle-class Tamils who now demanded a Tamil Eelam (homeland). Since 1983; direct war between Tamil separatists and the Government over the question of a Tamil Eelam. (LTTE: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam)

After Independence, the Sinhalese political elite became dependent on the rural masses (i.e. poor Sinhalese peasants) for electoral support. Consequently, they sought to alleviate rural poverty and unemployment in the Sinhalese regions through agricultural development (capital intensive irrigation expansion, land development and peasant resettlement). These Government policies increased the concentration of (high-yielding) land within a section of the Sinhalese population. The majority of the Sinhalese and Tamil peasants did not benefit.

These developments were escalated by the large-scale Mahaweli Development Project started in the 1970s. Large parts of the Mahaweli Project is located within the proposed Tamil Eelam, and was hence seen as Sinhalese colonization of Tamil Eelam. The construction of the Mahaweli Project was accelerated after 1977 (funded by the World Bank).

This broadened the Tamil-Sinhalese conflicts from being an urban (mainly) middle-class conflict to include the poor peasants in the rural areas. The Tamils now felt that they were becoming increasingly marginalized even within their own areas, that their area was simply colonized by Sinhalese.

The Indian Tamils were brought to Sri Lanka by British estate owners to work on the (labor-intensive) tea plantations (in the 19th century). Plantations are 'total institutions' that regulate almost every aspect of the lives of the workers (work, housing, markets, religious activities, education etc.). The plantation workers are segregated from the rest of society by the system of production and by ethnic characteristics. The plantation workers are thus confined to the plantation system and are strongly dependent on the plantation while also having little bargaining power (many similarities to slavery).

This system was used to increase the profitability of the plantations in the colonial period. After independence, the Sinhalese state used the same basic system to secure profits for the state. One way to control the plantation labor was to make sure that the workers did not get citizenship rights in the new and independent country. The ethnic differences were used to justify the increased oppression of the Indian Tamil plantation workers.

1948 Decision not to grant citizenship rights to the Indian Tamils (for fear of the political power this would give to a large number of oppressed and radical plantation workers).

1948-90 Decline in the profitability of the plantations; weakened position for the plantation workers.

1972-75 Plantations nationalized to secure the profit for the state. This created more insecurity about employment for the Indian Tamils while at the same time it also meant the entry of Sinhalese nationalism into the estates.

The Sri Lankan economy is an export-economy which is dependent on three cash crops: tea, rubber, coconut. The total production has been relatively stagnant while the prices for the export products in the world market have shown negative trends since Independence. This economic situation can explain the economic policy decisions made by the Sinhalese elite (e.g. the state-regulated economy), which in turn has contributed to the ethnic hostilities.

India is a regional superpower with strong interests in the situation in Sri Lanka because of the power of Tamil Nadu politicians and for larger geo-political reasons.

India's position and power is also a reason for Sinhalese nationalism. Sinhalese nationalists see Sri Lanka as being constantly threatened by India. Indeed, an Indian invasion was planned in 1984. This was never realized, partly due to the assassination of Indira Gandhi.

Tamil Nadu/India have provided training, economic support, supplies of arms and safe bases for the Tamil separatists. A solution to the ethnic conflicts seems impossible without the consent of India.

ii) The presence of Indian soldiers in Sri Lanka caused a spontaneous Sinhalese nationalist (JVP) uprising against the 'invaders'.

The capital-intensive agricultural development programmes (peasant resettlement in irrigation schemes) meant that the control of high-yielding land became more concentrated. The majority of the peasants were left in a situation of poverty and underemployment. For the rural youth very few opportunities existed. This crisis of poverty and unemployment in the rural Sinhalese areas created the movement called JVP.

JVP started off as a Marxist revolutionary movement made up of unemployed poor rural youth. In the 1980s the movement turned more towards Sinhalese ethnic consciousness and the strategy was shifted to that of 'revolution through ethnic struggle'. This increased the support (JVP members in the state apparatus) while at the same time the movement became more fascist in nature (as has also happened to LTTE).

1987 Spontaneous Sinhalese nationalist (led by JVP) uprising against the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord and the 'Indian invasion'. The Government was seen as traitors and hence made the main target.

1989 Increased use of torture and general violence by the armed forces and death squads.

The Government is now using the same kind of strategy against the Tamil separatists. In this case the strategy is less likely to succeed because of the strength of the LTTE and because of its external support. One possible indicator of this is that the strongman behind the hardline Government strategy was assassinated in early 1991.

<..This material on ethnic violence was prepared by Dr. Kristian Stokke, a doctorate in geography at Penn State who wrote his dissertation on development problems in Sri Lanka and who visited there in 1990..>

The struggle continues with continuing attempts at a negotiated solution unsuccessful, continued government attacks on the Tiger strongholds in the Jaffna peninsula in the north, massacres of Sinhalese and Muslims in north and east, and more assassinations of government and military officials.

"Sri Lankan rebels blow up ship off the port of Madras," NYT 17Ja93, p.13 talks of the Tamil Tigers destroying a ship carrying arms for their secessionist struggle after it was surrounded by the Indian Navy.-- Followup; the second in command of the Tigers was killed in this action. One suspicion of the Indian police is that the bombings in Bombay and other cities may have had Tamil roots as a revenge.

"Us and them," Economist 20Fe93, p.34 talks of pressure on independent newspapers. Unlike those funded by government which prosper but are not trusted, these are influential. There are two mainstream groups and a number of antigovernment political weeklies. Some weeklies are going out of business because the government has insisted they pay their bills (including those due to government agencies like electricity) on time. The newspapers say they are not being treated like other businesses. The mainstream groups have been accused by government of being run by feudalists. They are respectively controlled by Ranjit Wijewardene and the Upali Wijewardene family. The Cambridge educated heads may make the proletarian prime minister Premadasa upset. The families are related to Junius Jayawardene, Premadasa's predecessor. Ranjit Wijewardene is married to a niece of 4 time prime minister Dudley Senanayake.

"Sri Lanka Army makes gains against rebels," Edward A. Gargan, NYT 20Mr93, p.1 talks of army gains in the east while it is confining insurgency to the north. The government's confidence seems higher with this and with recent economic growth and it is proposing a political settlement. The death toll since 1983 exceeds 20,000. The major leader, Velupillai Prabakaran has indicated publicly for the first time that he is willing to consider a solution short of independence. Joseph Pararajasingham of the Tamil United Liberation Front noted the following demands of his party: 1 administrative linking of north and east; 2) limits on the right of Sinhalese to move into these areas; 3)devolution of power within some kind of federal system. On the other side are feelings such as those expressed by Gamil Jayasuriya, a former minister and now president of the Sinhala Protective Organization in Colombo: "All land belongs to all its people...The concept of traditional homelands we consider a myth..one kind of solution, bringing them to heel."

"Who killed Lalith," Economist 1My93, p.37 Police have fingered Tamils as killers of the major opposition leader Lalith Athulathmudali of the Democratic United National Front on 23 April. But there is a feeling it may have been a government hit. His bodyguard shot at the assassin who wore a black shirt. The man found by the police worse a white shirt. Lalith was well educated (unlike the prime minister) and had tried to impeach the PM. Tamils had also been accused to killing a defense minister Ranjan Wijeratne in March of 1991 and a general in August, 1992 but no firm evidence of their doing so has been presented. So conspiracy theories abound.

"Death in Sri Lanka: A paradise that lost its peace," Edward A. Gargan, NYT 3My93, A3 talks of the death of the main opposition leader and the Prime Minister in the same week. The PM died in a car bomb explosion. The Tamil Tigers are prime suspects; police said a piece of a cyanide capsule was embedded in the neck of the bomber; these capsules are a trademark of the Tigers. Firecrackers were set off in Sinhalese areas to celebrate the assassination. The PM was felt by many to be a ruthless and evil person.

Parliament will select a new president to serve until December, 1994, the next election.

2 letters, NYT 17My93, a16. Rajan Sriskandarajah, editor of Tamil Voice of US Tamils blames current violence on Sinhalese attempts to make the country one of one language and one religion with discrimination against Tamils. He advocates separation and self rule by each group. Niazul Huda says before independence the Sinhalese majority was dominated by the Tamils. The Tamils resorted to violence, encouraged by India; the LTTE is a creation of Indian security forces. The tragedy of Sri Lanka results from a regional bully intervening in a smaller neighbor. Karunyan Arul writes about political Sinhala Buddhism which has used the religion as a fetish and an idol to gain access to power. The Tamil minority had to take arms to defend itself. SB's ideology is exclusiveness, dominance and intolerance.

"Sri Lanka: Muzzling the press," The Economist, 30 Se 95, 36 notes that with a major offensive due to start in (the Tamil's biggest city in Sri Lanka) the Jaffna area in the next fortnight the government has ordered both foreign and domestic reporters to give their reporting to military authorities for censorship. The government has apparently abrogated its original commitment to openness when it was elected a year ago. "Some Sri Lankan newspapers make up stories, publish gossip as news, print misleading headlines and fuel racial mistrust."

"Sri Lankan war continues with worst day yet," CDT (AP dispatch), 4 Oc 95, 18A noted that 140 Tamil separatists and 27 soldiers had been killed in two battles in a Tamil counterattack on soldiers advancing onto the guerrillas' territory. Rebels were also reported to have attacked troop carrying ships, killing 15 soldiers and 3 sailors.

"Sri Lankan army drives on Tamil rebels," John F. Burns, NYT, 5 No 95, 12 says that after 12 years of civil war, the army reversed the tide of war by attacking and bringing the rebel capital, Jaffna, close to being overrun. The London office of the LTTE announced they were moving their headquarters to a group of villages to the east of the town.

"Two attacks intensify war in Sri Lanka: A paradise lost sees its bloodiest chapter," John F. Burns NYT, 12 No 95, 4 reports on a suicide attack by rebel Tamils (the Black Tigers) in the capital, Colombo, which killed at least 17. The casualties in the last three weeks of more than 7000 include 2100 dead.

A Multi-ethnic multi-lingual state and the problems of choosing one of the local languages as "official"

Linguistic states as a de facto policy and the problems they cause -- central government "takeovers"

A state built on assassinations (1947). What if Washington and Jefferson had not lived? Nobel prize winning activist, under house arrest since her party won 80 percent of the vote in 1990, is the daughter of the most revered pre-independence leader.

"For Muslims in Bombay, fear turns to grief and rage," NYT 15Ja93, p.a3 and "Week of rioting leaves streets of Bombay empty," NYT, 12Ja93, p3 and "In a Bombay slum, fires and flight," NYT, 13JA93, p.3. After the destruction of the Ayodhya mosque, riots took place in many parts of India as well as Pakistan and Bangladesh. Bombay was one of the worst hit areas. The extent has not yet been estimated but thousands of homes and businesses have been destroyed and most of the more than 620 (official toll) people killed this month were Muslims. In many places, police stood passively by, in others they have taken tough action. Shiv Sena, a Hindu fundamentalist group, has been blamed -- it is an ally of the BJP. J. R. Tata, India's best known industrialist, talked of the city being taken over by "mobsters and beasts in the form of men." There has also been a suspicion that some of the destruction has been sponsored by slumlords, anxious to clear out slum areas for redevelopment. An example of one such area is Dharavi where 600,000 are packed into one square mile.

"And now, killer buses; It's just too, too much," Edward A. Gargan, NYT p.4 12Je93 is a discussion of breakdowns in infrastructure in the capital of India, New Delhi. The town area was once capital of Mogul India; the current city was a masterpiece of urban planning by Sir Edwin Luytens. Now, Malvika Singh, assistant publisher of Business India said "there's no power and water. The phones don't work. The bus drivers are mauling human beings as they go by. It is grim." The population has quadrupled to 9.4 million in 30 years, faster than improvements in facilities. At current growth rates, there will be 13.5 million people by 2000.

"Yangon Journal: AIDS onslaught breaches the Burmese capital," NYT 11Mr94, P4. Aids epidemic is likely to ravage the country as it is its neighbors. Problems: large group of intravenous drug users, a migration of prostitutes, shortage of condoms, conservative culture making AIDS education difficult. Also Burma is the target of sanctions affecting international aid for health projects. UNICEF took a year to persuade the Burmese government to show a special film for Burmese TV, "Poisonous Love." Only the fact that General Khin Nyunt's wife is a physician made it possible.

"Burmese general bars talks soon with arrested democracy leader," NYT 7Mr94, A8 Philip Shenon. "The Burmese junta has yet to decide how to deal with its foe."

"Rao's new-year resolution," Economist, 8Jn94, 35-36. Narasimha Rao the only PM outside the Nehru-Gandhi to survive as much as half a parliamentary term. And looks good for second half. Was banking scandal (Bombay). Manmohan Singh fiannce minister architect of free-market reforms.

"Cold words over Kashmir," Economist, 8Jn94,36. Hopes for I-P reconciliation didn't last. Clinton admin prodded P into talks, but no go. Siachen glacier, nuclear proliferation etc. Bhutto turned tough.

"All in the family," Economist, 8Jn94, 36-37. Anura Bandaranaike assumed he'd take over SriLanka Freedom Party when mother Sirimavo B stepped down. But Mrs. B favors her daughter Chandrika. [The daughter did take over and won as prime minister. She then made herself President -- a more powerful post.]

"The tiger steps out...a survey of India," The Economist, 21 Ja 95 is an extended report on the state of that country. While focusing on the economy, the other aspects of the society are not flouted by any means. These surveys, which appear every few months on various topics are one of the attractions of this journal.

How a poor, weak, disunited country, endowed with miserable site and isolated situation, turned herself into a world power by deliberately changing her own geography.

That contrary to popular myth, geography is not permanent; that while it is not easy to produce major geographic change, such changes can occur, and do occur.

That major geographic change in one part of the world almost always produces political change, often accompanied by shock waves which can be felt in distant places. And how those political changes often take a form which is both unexpected and highly unpleasant for those who set off the geographic changes in the first place.

That major geopolitical changes, begun for whatever reason, often seem to acquire a kind of inertia--so that reversing them or even altering their direction can be accomplished only at great cost and with great turmoil.

Superficial similarities, especially as seen from a 19th Century European perspective

GNP, energy consumption, flows of exports and imports, literacy, and nature of population change and level of urbanization.

The basic difference in relations with the rest of the world: Japan as active agent; Southeast Asia as passive.

Why Japan is worth studying: a classic place for the study of the relationship between geography and politics. Japan's amazing political history over the last century, and its geographic dimensions: a quick recital of events

(1) Japan's astonishing internal changes: from feudalism to sophisticated industrial power in a century. Components of Japanese industry: optics, shipbuilding, electronics, machine tools, automobiles--and what such a combination means in the contemporary world.

(2) Japan's crucial role in the great international affairs of the last century:

Why, on any reasonable geographic grounds, none of this should have happened. A review of Japan's miserable situation and miserable site, which should have hampered the achievement of political power:

-- Isolation and the delay of Euro-American colonialism. The idea of Japan as "end of the line." "Intervening opportunities" for European imperial ambitions. Intervening opportunities for American ambitions. The importance of timing, and why Japan's time was beginning to run out by the 1850s. Why the Americans were interested.

-- Isolation from the Asiatic mainland in general, and from China in particular. Japan's peculiar permanent relationship with China. Japan's luck: China's continental political orientation, and the Chinese view of Japan as a barbaric land beyond the seas. Kublai Khan's attempted invasion of Japan as an exceptional event. Japan as a cultural dependency of China. The peculiar results of Japanese borrowing from China: religion and language as examples. The complicated results of laying the Chinese language atop Japanese. Language as isolator.

-- Isolation becomes public policy. Superficial resemblance between Japan and England. Japan as "the Britain of the Far East," and the analogue between Korea and Belgium. Why the analogue breaks down: the basic difference between a fragmented Europe and an east Asia, dominated by a single great power. Japan's permanent policy toward China.

-- Geology and landforms. Japan as part of the "Pacific Ring of Fire," and the results. Terrain, and a pitiful agricultural base. Japanese rivers. The poverty of important industrial minerals, and Japan's permanent need to import basic commodities. (See Atlas)

-- Climate, and its role in the traditional agricultural economy. How the details of Japanese climate fit into the grand world patterns of climate: more climatic analogues. Where rice grew, and why it mattered. "Old Japan," centered on Kyoto and Setonaikai vs. the frontier lands of Tohoku and Hokkaido.

-- Setonaikai as the heart of traditional Japan. Analogue between Japanese feudal states and Greek city-states. Why genuine centralized authority was rare.

-- Japan's precarious condition: population and poverty. The Malthusian balance. Chronic rice riots.

How Japan set about to redesign east Asian geography and join the world. And how, in the process, Japan changed the whole political face of east Asia and the western Pacific basin and caused shock waves that were felt across the world. A short chronology of recent Japanese political changes, and the geographic changes which occurred simultaneously.

(1) Japan on the eve of Perry's arrival. The Tokugawa Shogunate and what it involved. Tokugawa foreign policy. Tokugawa internal policies: the forcing of national unity. Feudal institutions and their persistence in present day Japan.

(2) Perry's arrival (1853), and the inability of the Shogunate to respond effectively without destroying itself. The Meiji Restoration (1867) and why it serves as a watershed in Japanese history and geography.

(3) Meiji government, and the emergence of a new Japan. Physical demolition of feudal power: the civil war of 1868. Fears of western conquest, and what they led to. The chain of reasoning that underlay the Meiji reforms. Army, navy, industry, urbanization, transportation, and agriculture. The population explosion. Efforts to produce more food. Japanese preoccupation about mineral deficiencies, and what it led to.

-- Sino-Japanese War, 1895. The fortuitous weakness of Manchu China. What Japan got, and what she lost, due to Russian interference. The beginnings of permanent enmity with Russia.

-- Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05, and its earth-shaking results. Annexation of Korea. The occupation of Manchuria: why it mattered, and why it still matters. Conversion of Manchuria into an arsenal and reservoir for excess population. Why the industrial policy worked, but the demographic policy didn't. The long-term effects on Chinese economic and population geography. Railroads as the catalyst.

-- World War I, and how Japan used it to enlarge her empire. Japan's inheritance of the German Pacific empire, and why it mattered.

-- Collision between Japanese and American ambitions. Growth of Japanese militarism. Government by assassination.

-- The unending Chinese adventure. The "Manchukuo incident" (1931) as the opening gun of World War II. Invasion of China (1937). How China reacted to the invasion.

-- The overseas results: creation of a political vacuum with the disappearance of Japan's huge temporary empire. Role of the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" in provoking nationalist movements in Southeast Asia.

-- The internal effects of total defeat. Massive physical destruction, and how it cleared the way for building a new infrastructure, using the skeleton of the old. Discrediting of old values, and the paradoxical combination of pacifism and pro-Americanism.

(6) The success of the American occupation. Social and political democracy. "Miraculous" growth of Japanese industrial power. The growth of new markets for sophisticated Japanese products, especially optics and electronics and automotive equipment. The end of the population explosion. Current worries over the aging of the population but ingrained reluctance to allow an official "guest worker" program, not to mention formal inmigration. Conflict between racist feelings and Japan's need for closer ties with its Asian neighbors.

In the last twenty or so years, Japan has been shaken by a number of shocks. First was the restriction on shipments of American soybeans for U.S. domestic reasons. Then the first and second oil shocks. Then the forced revaluation (upward) of the Japanese Yen which made Japanese exports less competitive. The beginning of the end of the ideal of "lifetime employment" in large firms. Potential aggression by Japan's neighbors, North Korea and China. The collapse of the "bubble" economy of the late 1980s and slow recovery so far. And politically, the overthrow of the political establishment that dominated the postwar period and a period of turmoil until a new or revised system replaces it.

The "new geography," and the unprecedented questions it poses. The question of energy: nuclear vs. oil? Furor over shipment of plutonium from Europe to Japan for its fast breeder and plutonium-cycle reactors. Accidents in the nuclear sector shaking Japanese assumption of superiority in engineering and construction as much as the Kobe earthquake. Responding to foreign demands that Japan revise or discard its customary ways: open markets, acceptance of foreign labor and migrants, etc. The question of rearmament and stationing of Japanese troops overseas to support international operations. The question of how economic power is to be used. The absence of historic analogues to suggest answers.

"AP, Reuters join Japan press club," AP, 1992. After years of being excluded, the first non-Japanese news organizations were invited to join the Foreign Ministry's press club. It holds news briefings closed to nonmembers and allows access to officials at home for night briefings.

"Japan's health system provides effective though spartan care," NYT, 26De92, p.a1 and a8. Life expectancy for men (75.9) and for women (81.8) is the highest in the world. Cost is 6.8 percent of the GNP compared to 12.8 percent of GNP in the USA. Everyone in Japan is covered by the government controlled system.

"Gloom lifts in US and falls on Japan," NYT, 29Dec92, p.a4. Based on NYT, CBS News, Tokyo Broadcasting System poll: both people view their economy as bad; Americans are more optimistic about their future; Each country expects its economy to lead the world in the 21st century, and Americans and Japanese disagree on trade. More than two thirds of the Japanese in the poll thought their government was more corrupt than America's.

"Can Japanese politics be purified? Sumo and Democracy," NYT, 10Oc92, p.A21. Reiko Hatsumi says his people are finally aroused over government corruption. Interestingly, he ascribes previous fatality about such abuse to geography and history. "The reason for this situation must be sought not in the present but in our past. We live on a chain of islands. For more than a millenium we have had a powerful, highly centralized government. Until recently, escape was virtually impossible, especially in the days when building ocean-faring ships was punishable by death. I would think that under these circumstances people tend not to develop or express individualistic, self-assertive thoughts. ,,, In a pinch you could swim across the English Channel. And William Tell could escape across the Alps with his bow, arrows and his son, leaving the apple behind."

Shintaro Ishihara. The Japan that can say no: Why Japan will be first among equals. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990. A controversial and blunt manifesto by a Japanese politician.

"Japan and America: Forget the growl, look at the tails," The Economist, 9Ja88, pp..17-20. "..some people hear ominous echoes of the strains that produced a shooting war between Japan and America half a century ago. They are mistaken: the tensions are those of growing intimacy, not breakdown." Is this reasonable; and is it still true?

"Miyazawa's foreign mission," Economist 9Ja93, p31. "Japan has already used its expanding Asian influence to assist the Americans. It has refused to join the East Asian Economic Caucus, a club invented by Malaysia that has an anti-western tone. Instead, it has thrown its weight behind the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum; thanks in part to Japanese insistence, this group includes America. Japan is also keen on the Asian Development Bank; it and America are the bank's biggest backers."

"Behind Japan's economic crisis," Akio Mikuni, NYT 1Fe93, A19 (op ed). Mikuni is president of the only indpendent credit rating company in Japan. Japanese companies will be concentrating even more on foreign markets. Troubles not what Japanese people think or foreigners suspect. It's finance ministry, independent of Diet, prime minister, everyone. Controls financial information. Created "bubble economy."

"Japan Builders graded politicians in giving cash," David E. Sanger, NYT 28Mr93, p11. Money given according to how much influence officials had in awarding contracts..."virtually every major politician in the country was given a letter grade that determined exactly how large a contribution they would receive twice a year."

That the Middle East is an area whose situation has made it quite literally a "crossroads of the world"--an area where so many major routes converge that it is impossible to ignore, and where great foreign powers have quarreled for domination of those routeways since the beginnings of recorded history. BUT, paradoxically, that the Middle East is an area whose site has been so wretchedly poor that with rare exceptions, it has had neither the population nor the wealth to fend off outside powers and to control its own affairs.

That the discovery of oil has fundamentally changed this age-old state of affairs by introducing huge wealth into areas which had only recently been among the poorest regions of the world, and thus introducing potential political power into places that had previously been politically impotent. In consequence, we are now witnessing an unprecedented state of affairs in the Middle East--not merely collisions between foreign powers, but now collisions between indigenous powers, struggling to control areas which they have had little experience in ruling, and attempting to cope with revolutionary ideas and revolutionary technologies.

On the geography of wealth. That despite enormous income from oil and gas, the Middle East is traditionally a region of desperate poverty, and much of it remains so today. Against that background of poverty, the Middle East contains islands of highly concentrated wealth, some valuable for reasons of site, some for reasons of situation. Conflict has repeatedly erupted for control of these "oases of wealth", and many such places have consequently been political hot spots for a very long time.

On the geography of modernization. That while much of the Middle East has stubbornly resisted the idea of "progress," certain specific regions have leaped ahead very rapidly, accepting and encouraging Western technology and ideas of modernization. These differences in stages of economic development have caused profound differences in political geography from place to place, which are often more important even than differences in language or religion or official political philosophy.

On the diffusion of ideas. That in spite of general poverty, the Middle East is so accessible to major routes of world trade that Middle Eastern ideas have moved rapidly outward into the far corners of the earth. That, in consequence, the Middle East has been a center for the spread of revolutionary ideas since the time of Moses.

Concerning geographic powder-kegs. When, in an area of chronical turbulent politics, new ingredients are added to the geographic broth--be they new nation-states like Israel--new military powers like the PLO or the Libyan army--new mineral resources like oil--or sudden changes in government like those listed on the next page, then the results are almost certain to be far-reaching. They are equally certain to be unpleasant.

The Middle East as a geographical unit: why it is hard to talk about the Middle East as a whole, but why it makes sense to do so anyway. The European idea of the "Middle" East. (The "Near East" originally represented the area controlled in Europe by the Ottoman Empire and thus extended from Greece into the area of present day Hungary and Yugoslavia. A question: is part of this Balkan area not still a little alien to the rest of Europe?)

How the intuitive idea of the area as a region emerged: the conjunction of (1) Moslem religion, (2) Arabic language, and (3) arid climate, and the way this conjunction works out on the map.

1. Religion. Why the map of Islam fails to define reasonable boundaries of the Middle East.

-- Divisions within Islam: the "Sunni" (majority orthodox) vs. "Shi'a" partisans and smaller groups such as the Druse, Ismailis, Alawites. Islam as a conservative philosophical system. Myths of Islamic unity.

-- The exceptions to Islam, and their extraordinary importance. Israel. Lebanon. Cyprus. Armenian Christians. Zoroastrianism. Other sects: the Bahai, and why they were persecuted.

2. Language. The special importance of Arabic. Arabic as a vehicle for Islam. Conservatism of written Arabic in contrast to spoken Arabic.

-- "Minority languages" within the Arabic realm, and what they signify historically. Hebrew, Armenian, Greek, etc., etc., etc.

3. Climate. The almost universal shortage of water. The great importance of exceptional areas: oases and exotic streams. Climate and topography and . . .

4. The Middle East as focus of routes. Which leads us to a brief discussion of . . .

The grand patterns of physical geography: how landforms and climate fit together.

1. Geology and its consequences: patterns of landforms, routeways, and minerals.

-- Stable continental platforms vs. arcs of Alpine orogeny. How plate tectonics helps explain these patterns. The stable areas of the south, and how they are coming apart. (Red Sea, and the Suez/Jordan Grabens: Gulf of Suez, Gulf of Aqaba. Relationship to the Great Rift Valley of Africa. Where Arabia fits in.)

-- What happens when platforms collide. The Mediterranean trench, and its relatives to the east. Persian Gulf and Indo-Gangetic Depression. Alpine arcs: the Zagros, the Elburz, the Anatolian arcs as part of the great Trans-Eurasian system of Alpine mountains.

-- The grand pattern: a review of world climatic patterns. What happens as one travels northward or southward from the Middle East. Why the latitude of a place is important. Egypt vs. Tunisia, and the Sea of Galilee vs. the Negev. Summarizing the effects of latitude.

-- The effects of mountain barriers on Middle Eastern rainfall. The main exceptions to the pattern of drought:

-- The Levant: differences between the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon ranges. Jordan and Saudi Arabia as rain shadows. Why the Cedars of Lebanon.

-- The Zagros fringes and rainfall patterns in Iraq and Iran. Effect on the Tigris-Euphrates drainage system.

-- The ITC and the Nile: impacts of ending the annual floods of the Nile by the construction of the second Aswan Dam and the creation of Lake Nasser. How this let the Russians into the Middle East.

-- Putting the patterns together: why Israel occupies a strategic location. The geography of petroleum: haves and have-nots.

A catalogue of troubles: A sampling of post-World War II events in the Middle East, to document the assertion that the Middle East has been the scene of an extraordinary variety and frequency of serious political trouble--trouble that has repeatedly involved great powers from outside the Middle East.

An introductory note: Why 1945 was a key date. The collapse of the old order with the removal of British and French mandates, protectorates, and various unofficial "arrangements." (Note the analogue with South and Southeast Asia at precisely the same time).

A pre-1945 overview. The lack of indigenous political power in the Middle East. Where the various European powers held sway. The role of oil in 1945 world politics. American reserves. Middle Eastern reserves.

1946: Azerbaijan and the end of the Russo-American honeymoon. The Truman Doctrine, and the unlikely pact between the US, Greece, and Turkey.

1947-48: Israeli war of independence. Cease-fire establishes de facto boundaries beyond the UN lines. How the Palestine refugee problem began. Origins of the problem of "The West Bank" and Gaza Strip.

1951: Iran nationalizes the oil industry. Anglo-American intervention; the CIAs proudest hour. Overturn and return of the Shah. Origin of Iranian hatred of U.S.

1952: Egypt: overthrow of the old order. The rise of Col. Nasser and what it portended.

1956: Suez War. Closure of the Suez Canal, and its effect on the technology of shipping and, in turn, on the whole geography of world oil trade. The super-tanker. Devastating impact of the Suez War on the role of England and France in the Middle East.

1960: Cyprus independence. First civil war breaks out. The strain on US foreign policy.

1967: Six Day War. Israel "solves" her boundary problems. Gaza Strip, Sinai Peninsula, Golan Heights, the West Bank (again), and Jerusalem.

1967-68: Development of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as a major force in Middle Eastern affairs.

1973: The Yom Kippur War. Generally status quo ante bellum. Do wars solve problems?

1973: Arab oil embargo. OPECs (founded 1961) finest hour. Profound impact of OPEC oil price increases and of OPEC political power. Oil wealth and Iran's conversion.

1974: Turkish army invades Cyprus. Partition results. More strain on the NATO alliance.

1979: Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty signed in Washington. Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. Beginning of anti-Egyptian coalitions among Arab states.

1979: Shah flees Iran. Ayatollah Khomeini returns. Moslem "militants" seize US embassy in Tehran. Oil price skyrockets on minor supply shortage.

1980: War between Iraq and Iran; fighting results in major damage to oil fields and refineries in Iran.

1981: Iran:Iraq war has little effect on oil supply. Oil prices peak then start slide. Ruination of oil exporting third world countries who had based planning on assumptions of continued high prices: Mexico; Venezuela; Nigeria . . .

1982: Israel takes advantage of Arab disarray and invades Lebanon. Triumph turns into disaster. U.S. Marines reap benefit of misreading of 1958 intervention.

1987: Palestinian Intifada. Breakthrough or breakup in Israeli/US/Palestinian knot?

1988: Russian retreat from Afghanistan. Important for breaking myth of Soviet Power? End of Iran-Iraq war. Stalemate a defeat for Iraq.

1990-1991 Iraq invades Kuwait, removed. Reality bath or more of the same old behavior?

1991- Removal of Soviet Union and a one superpower world lead to beginning of Arab-Israeli peace talks. "Diffusion" of islamic ideals (fundamentalism) from Iran to north African and Asian islamic countries begins to replace communism as a bogeyman for alarmists, including those anxious to avoid reduction in defence budgets.

"The Incessant Lure of Kuwait's Oil", NYT, 13/1/91, p11. Oil seeps, but Swiss expert said in 1920s there was no decided promise for drilling in Kuwait. But an ex-British officer (and a bit of a promoter or con-man) went to the US and got oil company interests up. British/American interests collided over who should get concessions. Anglo-Persian Oil stepped aside for Gulf (controlled by Mellon family of Pittsburgh). British Foreign Office diplomat said "The last thing we want is an oil war" with the United States. Reconsidered when oil found nearby by Standard Oil in Bahrain. Upshot a joint British-American venture, Kuwait Oil. Nationalized in 1970s.

"U.S. troops to build camps in north Iraq to aid Kurds; Bush sees 'temporary' role", NYT, 4/17/91, p.1.

Yair Evron. War and Intervention in Lebanon: The Israeli-Syrian Deterrence Dialogue. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1988. Makes point that at least since 1976, Israel and Syria have been coordinating their policies in Lebanon to avoid armed confrontation.

"The Nile: a gasping serpent," The Economist, 27/2/88. Impact on Egyptian agriculture and economy of low water flow into the Blue Nile in Ethiopia and White Nile from Lake Victoria.

"Israeli unanimity on Golan's worth: more than peace with the Syrians," NYT, 24/3/91, p.19. Shows how things can change!

"How the Middle East was invented," NYT, 13/3/91, p.A24. Term coined in 1901 by U.S. Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, naval geostrategist. Popularized in speeches in 1916 by Mark Sykes, a British M.P., who also helped negotiate the secret Sykes-Picot agreement which defined French and British spheres of influence in soon to be eliminated Ottoman Empire. Colonel Edward House, Woodrow Wilson confidant, said: "They are making a breeding place for future war."

"Turkish quake claims more than 570," AP, 14/3/92. In eastern Turkey, one of many natural disasters, notable among them drought, the area has to contend with.

"Spots in the Gulf," NYT 15/2/91, p.A35. Mike Dewar, deputy director of IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies, London) derided the impacts of the air strikes on Iraq's ability to fight a ground war in the Gulf. R. Kent Johns, a professional pilot, talks about the significance of the annual "khamsin" winds and sandstorms on the Gulf War campaign.

"A World Against Itself," The Economist, 2/6,88. This Survey of the Arab East talks about forces of unity and disunity. If you can't afford the time to read Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990) this is a good start to understanding the area.

"Gulf war's aftermath not so fun," CDT, 4/7/91, p.4B. George Will's column in the Centre Daily Times (just to show you even the local paper can have good stuff in it sometimes) asks whether the US is aware of the future burdens that will probably result in what it is doing when it blithely accepts such tasks as supporting the Kurds and Shiites in Iraq [or intervenes in Somalia or Bosnia-Herzegovina - avw].

"Israel study finds birth rate at lowest level since 1948," NYT, 11/7/92. The title tells the story here. The article talks about the demographic dilemma of Israel's jews in an area where their opponents' population growth is much faster. For instance, if Israel incorporated the Gaza strip and West Bank, there would be as many Arabs as Jews in the state in 25 years and Jews would then become an ever decreasing minority.

Europe--until recently a backwater--a tiny peninsula where the modern world was invented. [Etymology: Phoenician "Ereb", darkness]

(1) Europe's incomparable influence over affairs of the world during the last four centuries. Extent of political influence. Influence over economic aspirations. Europe as model of social organization. Languages. Religions. Technology and demography. Contemporary world as European world, despite the collapse of European empires. The "nation-state" as European idea.

-- Eastern (Continental) Europe vs. Western (Maritime) Europe. Eastern Europe as extension of Eurasia. (Russians and Mongols as analogues) Western Europe as oceanic fringe. (Roman and British Empires as analogues). The critical role of zones between the two: Mitteleuropa, the Balkans, etc. The constant shift in balance between the two. A split Germany as nothing new. Europe as peninsula.

-- Northern (Atlantic) Europe vs. Southern (Mediterranean) Europe. The reinforcement of political-cultural boundaries with physical difference.

-- Climatic differences: "Mediterranean" vs. "Marine west-coast" regions. Complementarity between the two regions.

-- Africa begins at the Pyrenees and Africa begins south of Rome are sayings of some age.

The great cultural division between northern and southern Europe: the epochs of European supremacy. (a) Rome, and its enormous importance in European memory. Roads, language, coinage, and religion. Rome as Mediterranean empire.

(b) Atlantic Europe, with its focus near the mouth of the Rhine and Thames. Protestantism and the commercial revolution. "The circle of poverty" with increasing distance from the center. Europe's critical location in the "land hemisphere".

The interdependence between time (history) and space (geography). The idea of a Mediterranean era and an Atlantic era in European history. The gradual migration of power from southeast to northwest. Spain and the United Kingdom as examples of the two periods, and their inordinate influence on the New World. Despite their differences, their extraordinary role as disruptors of traditional patterns all over the world. Germany as the major disruptive force in the twentieth century.

"New" nations are often prickly about their status and their legitimacy and work very hard to establish themselves among their peers. There is always a search for symbols to unite the nation. Under the right circumstances, this can involve aggression against neighbors. Germany is an example of this behavior carried to extremes, as is Japan. [Also Italy, Israel, Vietnam . . . Can you think of any others?]

In 1980 and 1990, the U.S. census of population asked a 1:6 sample of the population to indicate their dominant ancestry. For 1990, results for the 10 ten are:

Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Europe: A History of Its Peoples. London: Viking, 1990. Translated by Richard Wayne. Written by a Frenchman, this book was subsidized by a European initiative backed by a banker. Published simultaneously in eight European languages, it attempts to convince European readers that shared experiences over the past two millenia bring them together more than their conflicts drive them apart.

"Europe's hard core." The Economist, 21No92, p.77 says "The fast-adjusting economies of Eastern Europe -- Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland -- might be ready to join the hard-currency core of Europe surprisingly soon. Where would this leave France? Talks about potential strain as German-oriented eastern European countries get closer ties with the European Community. French and German interests are opposed.

"East is east and west is west, and what is in the middle?" The Economist, 26De87, pp.51-52. An interesting article on the past, current and prospective reality of a distinctive "middle Europe." Geographical definitions are argumentative: eastern Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland or the above plus Hungary, Slovenia and Croatia. A Polish art historian defines the area as C+M+B (Caspar + Melchior + Balthasar) chalked on house doors to tell you the house has been blessed by a priest for the new year, where ladies get flower bunches with an uneven number of stems and where people use duvets in bed. Roughly that would correspond to the Roman Catholic areas of the old Habsburg Empire.

"France sees integration as answer to view of immigrants as 'taking over'", NYT, 24Mr91, p3. In Birmingham, Frankfurt, Florence or Marseilles this article says, third world communities have become the targets of simmering xenophobia and occasional racist violence. Some ultranationalist groups court popularity by demanding that poor foreigners be forcibly repatriated. So it is not just in Germany that resurgent xenophobia is to be feared!

Letters to the NYT "Albanian population," 6Ap92 by Joseph J. DioGuardi, President of the Albanian American Civic League, "Why 'Republic of Macedonia' incenses Greeks," 12Ap92 by Nicholas Gage, and "For Neighborliness," 8Ap92 talk about problems of the new would be state of Macedonia. They were in response to a piece "'Free' Macedonia faces hostile world," NYT, 1AP92, p.a15 which describes the area thus; "For 1,400 years, the Slavic people who live here in one of the most jealously eyed stretches of territory in the Balkans have had a host of distant conquerors. A strategic crossroads on the land routes that connect the Adriatic to the Black Sea, and Europe to the Middle East, Macedonia was a dominion of the Serbs, of the Ottoman Turks, and of the Nazis in World War II, among others before it became a republic of Communist Yugoslavia in 1944. ...argument traditionally wielded by rival claimants to Macedonian territory. They maintain that its peoples are not properly a distinct nation but belong by language and culture, to one or another, or perhaps all three of the neighboring Slavic states."

"East's historians now facing new burdens," NYT, 24Mr91, p. 1,14. A "kind of mythological view of the pre-Communist period" is replacing old forbidden subjects. A "true" historiography needs to talk about items nationalists are uncomfortable about. They include the Jewish contributions to national life and the fate of Jewish communities, aggression by Poland and Hungary against Czechoslovakia in the 1930s and 1960s and the forced removal of ethnic Germans after WWII.

Lester Thurow, Head to Head: The Coming Economic Battle Among Japan, Europe, and America. New York: William Morrow, 1992. The Dean of the Management School at MIT argues that Europe is most to blame for the rise in protectionism in trade and also feels it is best placed to dominate the world economy in the 21st century. [Why do we focus so much on Japan in these two areas? Is it racism? Or do our elite see the Europeans as more like us, but with even longer holidays and fewer work hours per year?]

"Introducing Walt d'Isigny" The Economist 11Ap92, p.53. Discusses European, especially French fears of American cultural imperialism, focusing on the new Disney theme park in France and its attempts to blunt criticism.

"Next, el sobrepaso?" The Economist nd92. Spain has a very big black economy, where transactions never see the tax man. An estimate says 30 percent of the workers are so employed. Supposedly explains why there is little labor strife despite official unemployment of over 20 percent.

"A bitter split for Albania," NYT 4Ap91, p7. Talks about different voting patterns between cityand countryside and its implication for the country.

"The winds of war, 90's-style," NYT 6No92, p.a28. Talks about "war" with Europe of a new post cold war variety involving trade restrictions.

"Swiss reject tie to wider Europe," NYT 7De92, p.a7. The purest democracy in the world narrowly turned down a government plan to integrate closer with the European Community. The big and dangerous surprise was the split between French speaking Switzerland which was in favor and German speaking Switzerland which was opposed.

"Does America still need NATO," Parade 13De92. Manfred Worner, NATO SecGen notes that without the US, Europe would again become a powder keg. "Twice you fought wars in Europe because you withdrew...It is better to remain -- with reduced forces and with an increased burden for the other 15 NATO members -- so you will not be forced to return a third time."

nt NYT 3De92, p.a12. Austrian Defense Minister, Werner Fasslabend, sounded the alarm in Vienna this month about a "zone of instability like nothing in the past hundred years", that extended from the Baltic to the Black Sea.

"Support independent Macedonia," NYT 15Ja93, p.a26. Advertisement on op-ed page paid for by "The World Macedonian Congress & Friends of Macedonia." Key point: "Stop the immoral policy of Greece, admit Macedonia to the United Nations." Subpoints: 1:Greece is forcing an expanded war in Europe -- only western country and EC member collaborating with Milosevic's Serbia. 2:Greece is not for peace in the Balkans, but is now massing troops on the Macedonian frontier, destabilizing the Macedonian economy by blocking deliveries of food, medicine, etc. Motivation is pure territorial acquisition. 3:Greece is rewriting history; it has no historic claim on Macedonian territory or its name. Only in 1913 in the Balkan wars was Macedonia forcibly partitioned among Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia and for the first time in history Greece took possession of the southern part. 4:Greece is not a democracy, having opposed minority rights of its Macedonians with no freedom of speech, press or religion. Macedonian identity has been totally denied by the Greeks who forbid even the use of the Macedonian language. 5:Greece - and the coming war - is being supported by American dollars; for 45 years American taxpayers have supported Greek governments.

"Revival of a Greek tragedy: Same play, different actors: Does the world need another war," NYT 17Ja93, p.34 is a full page ad in the Metro section of the times. It is a response apparently to the ad above, paid for by "Americans for justice and peace in Macedonia." Starting with a series of negative New York Times reports and U.S. Government statements from 1946 when Yugoslavia's Tito set up the southern part of his country as Macedonia, it justifies Greece's reluctance to see that region recognized as a new nation under that name. To give you a flavor, "...the Skopjan republic clamors for recognition as "Macedonia." Its rhetoric and actions aggravate festering wounds! Echoes of the past ignite faded memories; gruesome visions of a not too distant, all too painful tragedy. ... Same play, different actors! They are after sovereign Greek soil again -- Macedonia! Not just the name. The name is but a ploy to validate the fraud; international recognition of a stolen heritage to endorse longstanding designs on land -- Greek land for 3,000 years, since before Alexander the Great, populated by Greeks."

"Europe's technology policy: How not to catch up," Economist 9Ja93, pp 19-21. Warning for Mr. Clinton. Robert Marjolin, French economist, "The intensification of research in Europe is necessary for psychological, political, and in a certain sense, moral reasons, to prevent the Europeans from losing confidence in themselves." Yet Europe still lacks self confidence and with good reason. The gap since 1980 between Europe, Japan and the US has widened except in a handful of areas such as computer aided manufacturing. Not a shortage of brains. US has 950,000 researchers, Japan 435,000, Europe 580,000. The Europeans produce three times as many scientific publications as Japan. Between 1940 and 1990, Americans won 143 Nobels, Europeans 86, and Japan 5. Basic science is relatively strong. R&D investment differs but not by much: US 2.9 percent, Japan 2.8 percent, Europe 2.0 percent - concealing big differences among countries. Americans and Japanese seem to be better at using the fruits of research. In Europe, science is still seen as culture. Pan-European projects are not very successful: Concorde, even Airbus. Eureka, backed by industry, has as its major benefit making companies think European. Maybe in a world dominated by multinations, regional technological research may be increasingly out of date.

"France jails woman for daughters' circumcision," NYT 11Ja93, p.a8. A Gambian woman was sentenced to 5 years, suspended, for paying a midwife $70 for clitorectomies and infibulation for her two daughters, 1 and 2 years old. The practice is still widespread in Africa and known in France among muslim migrants from Africa. Last year a midwife from Mali was sentenced to 8 years after 3 babies she had worked on bled to death.

The Economist 26Se92, p.56 reported that the new Estonian 5 kroon note shows the town of Ivangorod, currently in Russia. On page 50 it reported on exit polls of French voters who narrowly approved the Maastricht treaty designed to further European integration. Yes voters reasons included: peace in Europe; a desire to continue to build the European Community, and a feeling that a united Europe would compete better against Japan and the United States. No voters cited: fear for loss of French sovereignty; distrust and disgust with the Brussels eurocracy; fear of German domination and a dislike of President Francois Mitterand who had strongly supported the treaty.States.

"Europe warned on ethnic conflicts," Stephen Kinzer NYT 18My93 a6 Jose-Maria Mendiluce, departing as chief of the UN refugee program in former Yugoslavia said his 19 months there had taught him "people can be transformed into hating and killing machines without too much difficulty." The European attitude is that Balkan people are different. But he said that is a dangerous mistake. It could happen in Britain, France, Germany or Spain.

"Tariff cuts advance in new talks," Clyde H. Farnsworth NYT 15My, p.35 talks of new life being breathed into GATT talks by outside tariff cuts. The opening was made by the Japanese.

"The left at a loss," Economist 8My93, p.59 talks of the calling into question the European welfare state as its trading rivals, especially in Asia, do not have the cost of expensive health and welfare programs. It says parties that have dropped old orthodoxies about these programs have fared better politically. Points to Spain's socialists versus Britain's. But "Although socialism looks shattered now, the voters will not remain loyal to conservatism for ever."

"A forbidden fruit in Europe; Latin bananas face hurdles," James Brooke, NYT 5Ap93, p.1 writing from Colombia reports on cutbacks in banana shipments to Europe. There's a 20% tariff on the first million tons(?) and 180% on anything above that. There is a fear this move is another sign of growing protectionism in the EC. Latin America is seen as an American backyard. The European colonial powers have tried in this and other ways to help their former colonies in Africa, the Pacific and parts of the Americas.

"Slip me a beak," Economist 24Ap93,p60 discusses a bartering operation that uses a quasi-currency called the beak in Kingston-upon-Thames. Half the members of the club of 75 are "anarchists, hippies, and green idealists" but "normal" people like a postman, a car mechanic and a carpet shop owner are also members.

"Black pride," Economist 24Ap93 p.59 has a header that reads "Twenty-five years after Enoch Powell's notorious 'rivers of blood' speech, race relations in Britain have never been better. Disbelievers, read on." Bitterness over race, it says, although deepseated is mild compared with America's, Germany's or France'

"Our man in Tirana," Economist 13Fe93, p.57 talks about Britain's shrinking diplomatic representation overseas. In Tirana, Albania, offered a pick of grand old villas, the Brits have one diplomat answering to the embassy in Rome and housed in the basement of the French embassy. To reach him, you go through the French switchboard. The British ambassador in Moscow covers 11 countries, including Russia. Britain has fewer overseas missions (214, down fro 243 in 1968) than Italy (260). About 30 posts have been scrubbed in the Caribbean and the Americas and there's diplomatic representation in only 39 of 52 African countries.

"New law in France allows random identity checks," Alan Riding NYT 12Je93, p.2 is an example of tighter laws regarding immigrants. It's one of three pieces of legislation. One is a new law making it more difficult for French born children of foreigners to become citizens. Now it's automatic; it's to be a choice at 18. A coming bill will restrict rights of entry as immigrants or political refugees. It will make it easier to deport such people.

"Provencal herald language revival," Marlise Simons NYT 3My93 A8 The French government has told schools and teachers in regions with indigenous languages to start preparing for bilingual education, fulfilling a promise made 10 years ago. The Western European language bureau, created in 1982 by the EC has many funding requests for a budget of $4.2 million. Only 3 million of 15 million in Provencal speak that language (Occitan per linguists). France has 8 languages and a dozen dialects but has been among the leaders in trying to push linguistic uniformity.

"Chauvin was a Frenchman," Economist 20Mr93, p.53. Jacques Chirac "The GATT farm deal is null and voic, we shall not accept it. If this means a crisis in Europe then crisis there will be." Giscard d'Estaing promised not only to scrap the GATT deal but renegotiate the reforms of the CAP. "Worries about France have been growing for a while, Klaus Kinkel, Germany's foreign minister, has described France's threat to used its claimed veto over the GATT farm deal as 'unacceptable', adding 'Wei've reached a point where our conceptio no longer coincides with that of France." Otto Lamsdorff, President of the Free Democrats, said "The German economy is more important than the quality of our relations with France." The conservative's comments were made before the election and they've been quite accomodating since. Further, the UDF and RPR "have made it clear that they, like the socialists, regard Franco-German relations to be of 'primordial' importance to France."

"Fishermen take arms against a sea of troubles," Alan Riding NYT 1Ap93 p.4 talks of attacks by local fishermen (in Boulogne) on warehouses storing imported fish.

"On fast track to (gasp!) provinces," Roger Cohen NYT 13Fe93 p.4 talks of the move of Ecole Nationale d'Administration to Strasbourg to be completed by the end of the year. It is a potent symbol of the (socialist) government's commitment to decentralization. (It will be interesting to see whether the new conservative government carries out the move.)

"France: Change at last," The Economist, 5Mr94 talks about the turnabout in French foreign policy to a more atlanticist stance. This required a silent but radical reassessment after German reunification tilted the European balance of power away from France.

"Bar English? French bicker on barricades," NYT 15Mr94, p.1 Marlise Simons talks about proposed law facing vote in the National Assembly which would bar foreign words from virtually all business and government communications,r adio and tv, public announcements and advertising messages whenever a "suitable local equivalent" exists in French. Three groups: one sees English as hip and modern, another identifies with the glory of French culture, and the third says the other two exaggerated but that the world's cultural diversity is threatened by advertising speak and standardized products. Proposed replacements for some "franglais":

Airbag=coussin gonflable de protection; fast food=restauration rapide; jumbo jet=gros-porteur; marketing=mercatique; parking=parc de stationnement; popcorn=mais souffle;databank=banque de donnees; cookie=sable americain ...

"Kohl, due in U.S., loses some luster," Craig R. Whitney NYT 25Mr93 Political indecision, ailing economy, says too broke to help Russia any more than it has, struggle with Free and Social Democrats over allowability of sending German troops outside NATO area reducing clout. (British quietly gleeful; Bush had treated Germany as main US ally in Europe but UK only one to fully cooperate.)

NYT 28Fe93, F5 discusses plans of Allianz insurance company to expand in Asia; first german insurer licensed to sell in Japan, a hard act. "The world is evolving into three major economic blocs; Europe, the North American Free Trade Association and Southeast and East Asia."

"Germans plan to make it easier for some to obtain citizenship," Stephen Kinzer, NYT 25Ja93, a8 Tough to become a German citizen if you don't have a cultural link. If your great grandparents left for Russia, you are eligible. (As with Law of Return in Israel.) But even children born in Germany of parents born in Germany aren't citizens automatically if there's no German ancestry. The citizenry law was written in 1913 when there were few immigrants. Germany still doesn't consider itself an "immigrant" country. Current law allows foreigners of 15 years resident (8 if under 23) to apply for citizenship, but it's tough to get. About 10,000 nonGermans naturalized in each of the last few years. Under new proposals, foreigners who've lived in Germany 8 years or gone to school there could be granted citizenship without big expenses or exhaustive background checks. The prospective law would require them to give up their old citizenship. People like the Turks are reluctant to do that because their old government would then not let them inherit land or property in their old homeland.

James Cleugh, Spain in the Modern World, 1953 "Spanish 'liberalism' always has, and always will, represent only a strangely mixed minority of cosmopolitan intellectuals and illiterate opportunists. Spain is not, and never will be a 'democratic' country. In the century preceding its civil war (1936) Spain had three major civil wars, 26 revolutions and 109 changes of government.

"Italian party feeds on others' shame," Alan Cowell, NYT 5Ap93, A5 is a discussion of Umberto Bossi's Northern League (formerly Lombard League). Predicted not to get a majority even in the north (it got over 40% in the recent elections) because "it is the league's rough-and=ready expression of northern xenophobia--even racist attitudes towards southerners and immigrants.." The league wants a federal, free market Italy with strict immigration laws, taxpaying citizens and tight fiscal control over money sent south.

"Earth-friendly Dutch homes use sod and science," NYT 7Mr94,p.3 Marlise Simons talks of "environmentally correct" housing in the Netherlands. Ecolonia village/settlement with 110 houses near Alphen aan de Rijn.

"Climb in Russia's Death Rate sets off Population Implosion," NYT, 6Mr94, p.1. Michael Specter. ..all but stopped having children and death rate rising faster than any other country. Will take a generation to reverse, even according to optimists. Life expectancy of adult men 60 years. Number of children born per woman gone from 2.17 five years ago to 1.4. Deaths exceeded births last year by 800,000.

"In a town cleansed of muslims, serb church will crown the deed," NYT 7Mr94,p.1 Roger Cohen. Zvornik has been "cleansed" of its 40,000 prewar muslims. Mayor says Turks destroyed Serbian church there in 1463 when they arrived. Now rebuilding it and claiming this as Serbian land forever and ever. An Ottoman tower that stood on this cliff has been blown up.

GEOGRAPHY 128
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

What The Course Is All About

WORLD/GENERAL

AFRICA

NIGERIA AS AN EXEMPLAR OF WHAT WENT WRONG

SOUTH AFRICA: FROM PARIAH TO PROMISE

ASIA: A GLORIOUS 21ST CENTURY?

SRI LANKA AND SOUTH ASIA

JAPAN -- VULNERABLE TROUBLEMAKER

ISRAEL AND ITS TROUBLED NEIGHBORHOOD

EUROPE

UNITED KINGDOM

GEOGRAPHY 128 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS