B. FLETCHER. GEOGRAPHY 128. SPRING, 1995
NOTE to readers: Ms. Fletcher's paper was written in a word processor I cannot translate perfectly with my software. Some of the "niceties" which included a map and also the references did not survive the conversion! Nonetheless, the body of the paper is as in the original. It received a high grade.
ABSTRACT
Azerbaijan has a long history of political problems that have persisted throughout many efforts for a resolution. In this paper I will address these problems and identify ways in which they are related to geographic environment. I will also propose a possible solution and ways in which the underlying causes of the problem can be altered. This will not be an easy task. Azerbaijan's problems are deep-rooted and have been in existence for almost a century.
AZERBAIJAN
Azerbaijan is situated in eastern Transcaucasia, on the western coast of the Caspian Sea. It shares borders with the Russian Federation and Georgia to the north, Iran and Turkey to the south, and Armenia to the west. Azerbaijan, now independent, was formerly the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. It became a part of the Russian Empire in 1828, and regained its independence in 1918. Soviet power was established in 1920. The Azerbaijan Parliament was among the first of the former Soviet Union (FSU) states to adopt a resolution of sovereignty. In August, 1991, an amendment was made to the constitution to legitimize the independence of the Azerbaijani Republic. Since then, the country has undergone frequent governmental changes, and experienced political turmoil.
The Republic of Azerbaijan covers an area of 86,000 square kilometers, similar to that of Portugal. Over half of its 7.2 million population is urbanized. Baku, the capital, has about 2 million inhabitants and is a major harbor on the Caspian Sea. The country is endowed with fertile agricultural land, and ample natural resources, including petroleum. Azerbaijan is one of the oldest oil producing regions of the world. These resources make Azerbaijan a very desirable geographic region. Included in the boundaries of Azerbaijan is Nagorno-Karabakh.
NAGORNO-KARABAKH
Nagorno-Karabakh is an autonomous oblast (region) falling entirely within the borders of Azerbaijan. (See Figure 1) The enclave was created by Josef Stalin in 1922. Azerbaijan has been involved in a territorial dispute with Armenia over the political,
Figure 1 The autonomous oblast of Nagorno-Karabakh falls entirely within the borders of Azerbaijan.
socioeconomic, and cultural future of Nagorno-Karabakh. This problem is clearly related to geographic situation and site. The problem of situation is that the region is located in Azerbaijan, but is populated predominantly by ethnic Armenians. (See Figure 2) It has been described as a "mountainous island of Armenians in an Azerbaijani sea." (Fraser, 1990, p.656) The site contains one third of Azerbaijan's agricultural land and various natural resources. The people of Azerbaijan don't want to share this wealth with the Armenians. There has been a long history to the clash between these two states. The conflict continues to take a toll on the people and the economy. Nagorno-Karabakh had been a disputed territory during the period of Azerbaijani and Armenian independence (1918-1920), but in June 1921 the Bureau for Caucasian Affairs voted to unite Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia. However, some days after the vote, the decision was reversed and in 1923 the territory was declared an autonomous oblast within the Azerbaijan SSR. The fact that the territory has been in the hands of both regions has made it harder for the people of Armenia to see Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan's possession, and Azerbaijan has difficulties handling the fact that Armenians are living in their territory.
The dispute was brought to national attention in 1987 when hundreds of thousands of Armenians in Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, rallied for the joining of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia. Since then the countries have seen the consequences of irreconcilable priorities: hundreds of deaths and mass population transfers, with hundreds of thousands fleeing republics where they had lived for years, if not generations. The reasons for the increased number of protests around the period of 1985-1987 was clearly linked to the greater ease of voicing pent-up grievances because of the new Soviet policy of glasnost and it was natural that, under these new conditions, Armenians would feel the need to renew their Karabakh campaign. (Fraser, 1990, p.653) Both Armenians and Azerbaijanis claim the autonomous region has belonged to them for centuries, and both have dismissed the historical cases brought up by the other side.
Nagorno-Karabakh has had a very violent century. The troubles there began about 1905 and the costs of this conflict have been intolerably high. Many men, women and children have been killed. Thousands have been wounded and maimed. Property damage is estimated to be in the tens of millions of dollars, if not much greater. Families have been separated, and human rights observances have been a secondary consideration.
Azerbaijan and Armenia both have been guilty of violent acts against each other. There are no definite answers as to who is right and who is wrong. There does seem to be a more abundant amount of information about Azerbaijani violence than of that committed by Armenia, however. Azerbaijan also seems to be the more unreasonable of the two countries in dealing with this dispute. It manipulates the laws to suit itself and doesn't acknowledge other perspectives.
Azerbaijani demonstrations in July, 1988 were fueled by fears that un upcoming session of the USSR Supreme Soviet on constitutional reform would plan for an eventual transfer of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) to the Armenian republic. Later, Azerbaijan was accused of "economic terrorism" when they called for a railway strike to prevent the transport of supplies to both the NKAO and the Armenian republic in November, 1988. (Saroyan, 1990, p. 25) Azerbaijan continues to lash out against Armenia due to fear and hatred. On May 9, 1992, the organizing committee of the Party of National Independence urged the people to "rise in a struggle to liberate the occupied Azerbaijani lands." "We approve of any actions aimed at realizing this sacred goal," the statement's authors noted. ("Armenia Wins," 1992, p. 8) This promotion of violence by people in power will only exacerbate the problem and prevent it from ever being solved.
Azerbaijan's law on sovereignty, created in September of 1989, established the legal basis for rejecting federal laws that contradict republic laws. This law on sovereignty is noteworthy for the ways in which it applies the concept of sovereignty within the republic. It was proclaimed as a law of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic's sovereignty, but was in fact a proclamation of the Azerbaijani nation's sovereignty over the republic. The law's preamble refers to the Soviet Union not as a federation of independent national republics but as a "socialist federation of Soviet nations." The state language was reconfirmed to be that of Azerbaijani and the republic's land and natural resources were declared "national wealth" belonging to "the Azerbaijani people." According to the law, the borders of the republic are not to be changed without approval by a popular referendum, that is, without the approval of the Azerbaijani nation. (Saroyan, 1990)
The fact that the first and most persistent bearers of a glasnost - style political activism in Azerbaijan emerged not among the majority Azerbaijanis but from within the Armenian population of the NKAO would set the process of political change in the republic along a troubled, contradictory path. Azerbaijan is a good example of how a change from the traditional politics can be disastrous. The following statement by Mark Saroyan (1990) points this out:
Given the multinational composition of the populations in the republics -- aggravated by the unequal distribution of political power, cultural prestige, and economic resources -- the implications of ethnic differences inform the larger set of complex and troublesome challenges to the success of reform in the respective republics and the Soviet Union as a whole. It is thus the depth of the similarities, and not the equally important differences, that draws attention to Azerbaijan as an example of the ways in which conflicts between the old system and an emergent new politics can result in failed, and potentially violent, outcomes. (p.14)
AZERBAIJANI PERSPECTIVE
The Azerbaijanis claim that the crucial issue is the sanctity of recognized borders, an argument involving situation. Azerbaijanis naturally feel that since the region is located within their boundaries, that they should have complete control over it. The loss of control over Karabakh is painful to the people and is having a depressing effect on the mood of society. Every day hundreds of refugees from border districts reinforce the army of the unemployed and the homeless, of people driven to extremes. Abulfaz Elchibei, former president of Azerbaijan, said, "You won't meet a person here who doesn't assess what is happening as 'aggression by Armenia'." ("Azerbaijan Gets...," 1992, p.14)
Of course Azerbaijan and Armenia each have their own ideas for a solution to the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh. Dr. David Nissman, expert on Azerbaijan, stated, "The issues connected with the Armenian claims to Nagorno-Karabakh can only be resolved after the conditions which created the problem in the first place are removed." ("Implementation," 1991, p. 27) He states these conditions as: the retraction of Armenia's territorial claims to territories belonging to Azerbaijan; the retraction also by Armenia of actions taken by the Armenian government, including the annexation of the NKAO by Armenia; election of representatives to Armenia's parliament from that territory; and the repatriation of some 250,000 Azeris driven out of their ancestral homes and off Armenian territories and compensation for the possessions and everything else they lost as a result of this expulsion.
There have been repeated acts of violence against the Azerbaijanis that have continued to eat away at the patience of the country. In 1988, more than 200,000 Azerbaijanis were forced to leave Armenia. More than 100 people died, including women, children and the elderly. Violence against Azerbaijan has resulted in aggressive retaliation. Dr. Nadir Mekhtiyev, member of the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet, stated, "I am deeply saddened to say that certain groups in Azerbaijan and elsewhere used the anger and frustration of these displaced persons to further their own ends, and in February 1988 the tragedy in Sumgait occurred." (Ibid., p. 30) Physical and psychological exhaustion is the norm in Azerbaijan today. The Azerbaijanis no longer believe that independence is possible without outside help. Apathy, anger, and hopelessness reign.
ARMENIAN PERSPECTIVE
The Armenians claim that human rights and the right of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh to self-determination are the crucial issues. They conveniently ignore the geographic issue brought up by their enemies, that the region is located on Azerbaijani soil, just as Azerbaijan chooses to ignore Armenia's claims. Armenian President Ter-Petrossyan said that Armenia does not covet any property beyond its borders, and that they want dignity and self-determination for Armenians living in the Karabakh region.
There are many incidents of violence against the Azerbaijanis, but there are equally many if not more atrocities committed against the Armenians. Over 10,000 Armenian men, women and children have been dragged from their homes and told not to return to the Karabakh region. There are reports of Armenians that have been illegally detained, beaten and tortured. In January of 1990, Azeri forces attacked and killed over 100 Armenians. In May 1991, Soviet and Azeri forces collaborated and surrounded two little towns, jailed hundreds, and were responsible for the deaths of over sixty innocent Armenians. The Armenians are a distinct minority who are surrounded by and subject to hostile Azerbaijani - Soviet rule. They are exposed to daily humiliation, human rights abuses, intimidation and physical attacks and violence. Upon looking at the rates of deportation of villagers from the villages of their ancient homelands, accompanied by atrocities of rape, looting, killing and murder, there seems to be an asymmetrical case. The Armenians are the larger victims at the moment.
The list of Armenian complaints in the cultural sphere, from under-funding of local Armenian education to the lack of Armenian-language textbooks and television broadcasts, are comprehensible in an institutional context in which the state's subsidization of cultural development favored the Azerbaijanis over other ethnic communities resident in Azerbaijan. As long as Nagorno-Karabakh remains in the hands of the Azerbaijanis, the Armenians are doomed for injustice.
The borders around Nagorno-Karabakh have caused great heartache and strife for both the Armenians and Azerbaijanis. Congressman Joe Kennedy (1991) stated:
These arbitrary lines have institutionalized a policy of effective discrimination against Armenians, to go beyond simple economic and cultural isolation. It has fueled a conflict that has led to some of the worst human rights practices in the world. Forced deportations, baseless detention, unwarranted killings bring to light the frustrations and illegitimacy of 70 years of Azerbaijani rule.
(Ibid., p. 5)
Armenian attempts to change the status of Nagorno-Karabakh can be traced back to the 1930's. Various petitions and appeals demanding the transfer of this area to Armenia were made in the 1960's and 1970's with no positive response from Moscow. Azerbaijani critics have tried to say the movement for Karabakh's union with Armenia is a product of foreign Armenian agitation, however, it was initiated and has been continued primarily by the Armenians living in the NKAO itself.
MEDIATION
The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan has resulted in other countries choosing sides, as often happens. The fact that the regional powers most keenly interested in neutralizing these disputes (Turkey, Iran and Russia) have their own sometimes conflicting strategic and policy aims in the region continues to obstruct mediation efforts. (Fuller, 1993) The dispute in Nagorno-Karabakh is the longest-running of the current Caucasian conflicts and it can also claim the dubious distinction of being the subject of the most peace initiatives - with notable lack of success.
Turkey has seen Azerbaijan as a gateway to Central Asia, and therefore has taken many steps to help the country. On April 6, 1993, Turkey's Prime Minister Demirel said, "Turkey is prepared to make any sacrifice" to help Azerbaijan. ("Armenian Attack...," 1993, p.23) Turkey's interest in Azerbaijan is obviously related to its site and situation. Turkey denies having any secret intentions. Nuzhet Kandemir, Ambassador to the Turkish Embassy stated, "Turkey is deeply concerned about the ongoing tragedy in the Caucasus, occurring so near her borders. She is doing her best in close cooperation with the United States and various international organizations, to contribute to a peaceful solution to this conflict." (1994, p. A 7:2) However, in 1993, Turkey closed its border with Armenia and stopped supplies of humanitarian aid. ("Retreating," 1993)
Iran, on the other hand, will do anything to prevent Turkey from excelling. Iran has supplied aid in the form of oil and food to the Azerbaijani people. Elizabeth Fuller (1993)
says:
This is not to deny that Iran has a fundamental interest in promoting a peaceful settlement of the Karabakh conflict, if for no other reason than to preclude Turkish military intervention in the region. At the same time, any peace proposal that Iran perceives as enhancing Turkey's prestige is doomed to failure. (p. 90)
Russia is also very much involved in this conflict. The Russians protest that their interest in the former Soviet republics to the south is purely strategic, and for everybody's good. Recent occurrences in Azerbaijan suggest otherwise. In November, 1993 Azerbaijan's state oil company signed a secret deal with a Russian company, Lukoil, which is believed to give the Russians a 10% stake in plans to drill for billions of barrels of oil under the deep waters of the Caspian sea. Diplomats in Baku say the government of Azerbaijan has promised the Russians more than 10% if there is a settlement of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. In other words, the Russians will be rewarded if they can return Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani control. President Geidar Aliyev admits that no pressure from the United Nations or any western body can stop the Armenians taking more land. The Armenians believe that only Moscow can call a halt to the fighting. Many in Baku believe that Aliyev has also promised an agreement on Russian bases in Azerbaijan and Russian troops on the Iranian frontier. ("The Bear," 1993)
The United States, of course, also has its self interest in mind. In September of 1994, President Clinton met with Azerbaijani leader Geidar Aliyev in New York. In this first meeting since Aliyev was elected President in October 1993, the two discussed the prospects for implementing an oil production contract, as well as the problem of a Karabakh settlement. "Washington is making no secret of its intention to take over Russia's role as arbiter in a Karabakh settlement." ("U.S. Fully Supports," 1994, p. 24) Both Moscow and Washington know that control over Azerbaijan will mean control over the flow of oil from that region to Europe.
Mekhtiyev said, "Unfortunately, the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh has become a trump card for those who wish to create and manipulate tension in the region to achieve political and economic goals." ("Implementation," 1991, p. 29) If these so-called mediators in the conflict are only out for their own advancement, Nagorno-Karabakh will always be a region of violence and warfare. The fate of Azerbaijan rests on the political situation in Russia and on the interest of Western countries -- primarily the United States -- in an oil pipeline connecting Central Asia to Europe. But erecting the pipeline probably depends on resolving the war in Nagorno-Karabakh, and that may remain a trouble spot well into the twenty-first century says Arif Yunusov. (1994)
PROSPECTS FOR RESOLUTION
It seems as if all the prospects for resolution have been tried with failed results, but we must work to end the violence as quickly as possible. Neither fire and bloodshed nor ethnic and religious hatred will solve the problems of the innocent people of Nagorno-Karabakh, both Azerbaijani and Armenian. The Co-Chairman of the Helsinki Commission, Senator Dennis DeConcini (1991) stated:
This conflict over territory seems unsolvable, and for those of us who are neither of Armenian or Azeri descent, it is unclear how justice could be done to both sides; but what is absolutely imperative is the necessity of strict observance of the human rights of Armenians and Azeris in this region. ("Implementation," p. 2)
Anatoly Shabad, member of the Russian Supreme Soviet (1991) said:
One of my most important observations is that the situation is so grave that both peoples are very deeply -- equally deeply convinced in the rightness of their cause ... Now this conviction is so strong that there is no way, no chances left that the conflict may be solved based on historical and local grounds. No such arguments, no reference to the history can have a decisive influence on the solution of the problem. (Ibid., p. 15)
As evidenced by this quote, many ideas for a resolution have already been eliminated. So many things have been tried that it almost seems as if there will never be an end to this terrible situation. Minor concessions to the Armenian population of the NKAO have proven ineffective and handing the NKAO to the Armenian republic would provoke the population of Azerbaijan. A new solution must be discovered soon and put into effect or the bloodshed will continue indefinitely.
In October, 1993, at a meeting held in Istanbul, the leaders of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbedistan met and ended with the signing of a joint declaration. Although the document did not contain an open condemnation of Armenia's actions, one could nevertheless clearly detect indirect disapproval of that country's actions. The Presidents of the six countries are convinced that a settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict will be possible only given compliance with the respective resolutions of the UN Security Council. ("Central Asian," 1994)
The most recent documented occurrences of Azerbaijan, as of January, 1995, were in an article titled, "Azerbaijan: Kuwait of the Caucasus." It states that, "Since the Soviet Union collapse, almost all the news about Azerbaijan in the international press has reported its war with Armenia over the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. But that may have changed forever in September." (p. 34) That is when a group of companies signed a contract to drill three new oil fields under the Caspian Sea. This "contract of the century" will be worth almost $8 billion and will, according to those at the signing ceremony, turn Azerbaijan into a second Kuwait. Maybe this turn of events will take the focus off of the NKAO crisis and help to alleviate the problem.
MY PROPOSAL FOR RESOLUTION
The solution to this problem is not going to be a simple one. The problems are so deep rooted that only a drastic change, if any, has a chance of working. The hatred of the people in these two regions runs very deep and no one is going to be completely satisfied with any solution. The problem is based on boundary lines. When Stalin drew the lines for each region and the oblasts within, the disputes began. Of course there have been other variables added over the years. If there wasn't an actual boundary line around the region of Nagorno-Karabakh it seems that the problems might eventually disappear.
I propose that the borders around Nagorno-Karabakh be lifted. (See Figure 3) Because the boundaries are not physically present, the effects of this change will take a while. Eliminating the lines would do away with the need for a capital, a president, and even the name, Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenians would still be living on Azerbaijani soil, but there would not be a definite territory to quarrel over. The Azerbaijanis already control all the laws in the region, so it would not be taking away any control from Armenia.
This solution seems ridiculous, but almost everything has been tried, resulting in failure. There will still be disputes for a while as to whether the Armenians should be allowed to live there and whether or not they should have to obey the Azerbaijani laws. However, these problems are already present. Getting rid of the boundary lines would not create any new problems and could possibly alleviate some of the ones that are occurring now. A problem that has lasted for almost a century is not going to dissolve overnight, but something needs to be done to end the hatred and violence.
CONCLUSION
The dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan is mainly a geographic problem of site and situation. When the borders were drawn, the problems began. There is a long history of warfare and no attempts at a resolution have been successful. The Armenians and Azerbaijanis have very different views of the situation and are not about to listen to each other on the subject. There have been many mediators "helping" to end the dispute under false pretenses. There seems to be no simple solution. Only a drastic change has any chance of making an impact on the situation. Eliminating the existence of the autonomous oblast of Nagorno-Karabakh may be the best bet. This solution favors neither country, and should not introduce any problems that aren't already there. With any luck, my proposal, along with the recent oil agreement, will draw attention away from the NKAO crisis and the dispute will eventually fade away.
Figure 3 Lifting the borders around Nagorno-Karabakh, thus eliminating the region, is a possible solution for an end to the dispute.